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ABSTRACT 
 
Governmental-Owner Power Imbalance and Privatization. (August 2010) 
Kehan Xu, B.S., China Criminal Police College; M.B.A., University of Miami 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Laszlo Tihanyi 
 
Privatization is defined as the sale of state-owned assets by governmental 
agencies to private investors (e.g., Megginson, Nash, Netter, & Poulsen, 2004; Villalonga, 
2000). Research on privatization has focused on privatization techniques (e.g., share issue 
privatization or voucher privatization), social welfare, governmental commitments to 
economic development, and varieties of outcomes of privatizations. Most prior studies 
from the financial economics perspective take privatization as a natural research context 
to examine the function of capital markets, the impact of national institutional settings, 
and the differences between partial privatization and initial public offerings. Very little 
research, however, has examined the determinants of privatization from an organizational 
perspective. 
This dissertation proposes that privatization decisions of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are influenced by different interests in governmental agencies. Using the resource 
dependence theory, I studied the power relationships of SOEs and their governmental 
owners. Four panel databases of 206 pharmaceutical firms across eight years in China 
were combined to answer the research question of this dissertation: What is the role of 
power imbalance between different governmental owners in the privatization of an SOE? 
The results suggest that organizational effectiveness and efficiency of an SOE increase 
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the likelihood of its privatization. Results also show that provincial governmental owners 
are more likely to privatize SOEs if they can successfully attract foreign direct 
investment projects. Furthermore, the likelihood of privatization increases with the power 
asymmetry between the provincial government and the central government but decreases 
with the degree of the defense mechanism used by SOEs.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Modern business enterprises are contested living entities that face organizational 
and political pressures and influences (Henisz & Macher, 2004). From the perspectives of 
finance and economics, a firm’s value can be evaluated by the cash flow it provides to its 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). From an open system’s perspective (Seashore & 
Yuchtman, 1967), a firm is an integrated vehicle that is characterized by intersecting 
interests of different groups of resource providers and actors (Schneper & Guillen, 2004).  
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have attracted scholarly attention for more than 
two decades (e.g., Megginson & Netter, 2001; Uhlenbruck & De Castro, 2000; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994, 1997, 1998; Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000). Across different 
disciplines in social science (e.g., economics, finance, international business, strategic 
management), in general scholars agree that SOEs play important roles in economies 
worldwide (e.g., D’Souza, Megginson, & Nash, 2007). The definition of SOE that is 
generally accepted by researchers states that government authorities remain tightly in 
control of the firms’ corporate governance and strategy by directly holding controlling 
shares and also serving as members of the board of directors (Estrin & Perotin, 1991; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Taken from the open system’s view (e.g., Ocasio, 1997; Scott, 
1992; Spender, 1996), SOEs were established as the extended systems of government 
agencies to facilitate the central-planning mechanism in their countries. Hence SOEs, as 
open systems, not only make products and other factors of production, but also sustain 
dynamic relationships with governmental planning authorities. 
_________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Academy of Management Journal. 
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Privatization is defined as the sale of state-owned assets by governmental 
agencies to private investors (e.g., Megginson, Nash, Netter, & Poulsen, 2004; Villalonga, 
2000). Privatization, as a substantial organizational phenomenon, adds an interesting 
perspective to the understanding of strategic behaviors of SOEs and motivations of their 
governmental owners.  
As the incremental asset-restructuring action taken by the Thatcher administration 
in the United Kingdom (U.K.) in the 1980s, the first wave of privatization accounted for 
over 10% of the U.K.’s gross domestic product (GDP) and took about 12 years to 
complete (Megginson, 2007). By the end of 2007, over half of the state assets were 
privatized worldwide, with cumulative proceeds approaching $1.5 trillion (Megginson, 
2007). Between 1987 and 1999, the total amount of the exchange value of privatization 
between formal state owners and private investors was about US $860 billion worldwide 
(Gibbon, 1998). By the end of fiscal year 1999, the annual revenue of privatized formal 
SOEs worldwide exceeded $1 trillion (Jones, Megginson, Nash, & Netter, 1999). Recent 
evidence also shows that privatization programs involved $410 billion from 1990 to 2003 
through 7,860 transactions in emerging markets (Kikeri & Kolo, 2005). 
In addition to its significant economic value, privatization is of theoretical interest 
because of the in-depth insight that it adds into the long-standing academic debate of 
whether firms without exclusive control by governmental owners perform better. Because 
government authorities pursue multiple political and social objectives rather than 
focusing on profit maximization, political intervention distorts the strategic objectives of 
firms (e.g., Perotti, 1995; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Agency theorists also state that 
government authorities have control rights but not cash flow rights, so government 
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authorities have no incentive to monitor organizational performance (e.g., Fama, 1980; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Transition economies undergo economic liberalization (i.e., letting market forces 
set prices), restructuring, and privatization in order to enhance macroeconomic 
performance. Basically in transition economies, the market forces replace the central 
planning authorities in the allocation of resources in different countries (Roland, 2000). 
Hence, the transition process usually involves changes in the role of the government and 
thus the creation of fundamentally different governmental institutions and the promotion 
of private-owned enterprises, markets, and independent financial institutions. Transition 
economies, therefore, are a subset of emerging markets1 because the group of transition 
economies is made up of these nations that adopted a government central-planning 
mechanism previously and now are shifting toward a market-oriented resource allocation 
mechanism (D’Souza, Megginson, & Nash, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 2000). 
Thus, Thailand and Indonesia are emerging markets but are not considered 
transition economies because these nations had not previously implemented central-
planning systems. China and Vietnam, however, are typical representatives of transition 
economies. Privatizations that have occurred in transition economies have triggered 
radical organizational transformations and have fundamentally switched the strategic 
directions of those newly privatized firms. For instance, privatization has generated 
significant influence on strategic managerial applications such as the incentive alignment 
of executives and the development of market-based skills (e.g., Barberis, Boycko, 
                                                 
1 Originally brought into scholarly attention in the 1980s by the World Bank economist Antoine van Agtmael, emerging 
markets is used to describe a nation's social or business activity in the process of rapid growth and industrialization 
(e.g., Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2000). 
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Shleifer, & Tsukanova, 1996; Filatotchev, Dyomina, Wright, & Buck, 2001; Ramamurti, 
1992; Yarrow, 1998).  
Compared with other transition economies, perhaps the biggest difference in the 
transition path is found in China (and also in Vietnam), where economic reform and 
transition to markets occurred while governmental authorities retained sufficient power 
over the economy (e.g., Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008; Qian & Roland, 1998). In China’s 
case, liberalization proceeded incrementally, and privatization was delayed until very late. 
As Roland points out, ―the Chinese experience where privatization remained taboo until 
recently also shows the importance of reform in the organization of government with the 
decentralization of government…‖ (Roland, 2000: 342). The central government in China 
designed the decentralized fiscal policy along provincial lines, and provincial 
governments have played important roles in local economic decision-making and 
resource allocation (e.g., Qian & Roland, 1998).  
Before the decentralized fiscal policy was implemented, the central government in 
China (and also Russia) used to plan all the provincial governmental expenditures (e.g., 
Qian, Roland, & Xu, 2006). In other words, the provincial government collected revenue 
for the central government, and all provincial governmental expenditures required formal 
approval from the central government (Roland, 2000). The implementation of the fiscal 
decentralization not only led to power dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) by state-
owned enterprises on their provincial governments (in terms of provincial government 
revenue), but also ensured that provincial governments have the authority to determine 
the structure of their expenditures and their fiscal arrangements with SOEs they own and 
their sub-provincial governments (Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 2005). In short, fiscal 
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decentralization has created a power center in each and every province of China 
(Emerson, 1962), and the power comes from its fiscal strength and its provincial 
economic performance.  
Privatization transfers SOE managers from being under governmental oversight to 
being under the control of private investors (D’Souza et al., 2005). As Estrin and Perotin 
(1991) pointed out, state-owned firms are immune from capital market scrutiny because 
managerial performance of these SOEs is inadequately monitored by profit-driven private 
investors. Following privatization, private investors enhance the capacity to spur greater 
managerial effort and accountability. As a carefully designed procedure, therefore, 
privatization essentially puts SOE managers under the pressure of profit-driven private 
investors. Hence one of the major objectives of privatization, from the governmental-
owner perspective, is precisely to achieve a better allocation of managers to production 
assets.  
Thus, privatization can be considered as an instrument designed by governments 
to revitalize their SOEs and implement the market-based resource allocation mechanisms 
in their countries. Evidence indicates that governmental owners in different countries 
design and implement privatization in order to achieve significant efficiency 
improvements in their economies (e.g., Megginson & Netter, 2001). Although 
governmental ownership is characterized by less demanding tasks and inadequate 
monitoring (Kornai, 1992), SOE managers have to deal with huge levels of uncertainty 
generated by planning authorities, given the unstable and hard-to-predict governmental 
policies. For example, SOEs in transition economies accumulate substantial levels of 
slack resources just in case their governmental owners suddenly increase their 
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output/production target in any year (e.g., Peng & Heath, 1996). Private ownership, in 
turn, can encourage SOE manages to improve organizational efficiency and autonomous 
strategic decision-making mechanisms based on the rich information from the product 
marketplace.  
Hence, privatization redefines an organization’s strategic objectives. In the pre-
privatization stage, firms must pursue multiple and often conflicting objectives; however, 
privatized firms are more focused on building competitive advantages by facing pressures 
directly from the product marketplace. When state-owned, organizations usually take on 
financial and operational structures designed to meet multiple and politically motivated 
objectives. Following privatization, firms become more focused on profitability. So, 
privatization can be seen as an organizational transformation process whereby the SOE 
becomes fundamentally transformed in order to compete as a private firm in the 
marketplace.  
Both researchers and policymakers have acknowledged a wide spectrum of 
macroeconomic and organizational consequences of privatization and have sought to 
explore its different aspects, including determinants, timing, and process. Studies 
focusing on the determinants of privatization have focused on governmental motivations 
to sell SOEs. For example, Goel and Budak (2006) studied the determinants of 
privatization and concluded that greater economic prosperity, greater unemployment, and 
lower inflation seem to induce small-scale privatization but have little effect on large-
scale privatization. Drawing samples from countries in Central and Eastern Europe, these 
authors analyzed macroeconomic factors (e.g., country size, government size, and 
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unemployment rate) as well as a number of exogenous influences (e.g., backup from the 
former Soviet Union). 
In addition, federalism and soft budget constraints are considered two possible 
alternative means of privatization (Qian & Roland, 1998). These two authors demonstrate 
that the government’s incentives to bail out inefficient projects are determined by the 
trade-off between political benefits and economic costs. The economic costs are 
dependent on the decentralization of the government’s fiscal policy. Interestingly, 
however, other researchers have different views regarding bailouts by governments 
(Kornai, 1980). For example, in an empirical study by Earle and Estrin (2003), they 
found that soft budget constraints might induce asset restructuring (e.g., privatization), 
but the effect was small and insignificant.  
The privatization decision, specifically considering the significant economic value 
and the organizational consequences generated by privatization, is the focus of this 
dissertation. This study rests on the assumptions that governmental owners sell SOEs 
selectively and employ complex sale transactions. Furthermore, governments are 
composed of different levels and branches with dissimilar interests, access to resources, 
and unique power relationships with their SOEs. Therefore, it is logical to expect that the 
decisions of different governmental agencies influence the likelihood of an SOE’s 
privatization differently. Since privatization can be conceptualized as an organizational 
transformation process whereby former SOEs with appropriate incentives start to 
compete as private firms in the marketplace, such transformation may be supported by 
some governmental owners but opposed by others. Their influence regarding an SOE’s 
privatization may depend on their power and resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
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RESEARCH QUESTION AND RESEARCH SETTING 
This dissertation studies the influence of the power imbalance of different 
governmental agencies in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry between 2000 and 2007. I 
ask the following research question:  
Research Question: What is the role of power imbalance between different 
governmental owners in the privatization of an SOE?  
The institutional environment of China may be suitable to examine power 
relationships for three reasons. For one, the Chinese SOEs are characterized by strong 
and apparent government-firm relationships (Nee, 1992). According to Nee’s perspective, 
the more marketized firms are, the less tied those firms are to governments, which means 
that they enjoy lower transaction cost advantages (Coase, 1937; Rajan & Zinglas, 1998). 
Some researchers consider these relationships as building blocks of China’s network-
based capitalism (e.g., Boisot & Child, 1996). Empirically, in certain stages of the 
developing process, firms that are less tied to the central government of China perform 
better (Park, Li, & Tse, 2006). 
Second, the Chinese institutional environment offers a useful setting to study 
governmental power relationships and their impacts on SOE privatization. Privatization 
policies in China are designed by the central government but implemented by provincial 
governments (i.e., local governments in the context of China). The decentralization of 
fiscal authority allows provincial governments in China to keep their revenues within 
their regions for economic development, and, therefore, provincial governments may 
have different incentives to privatize SOEs than the central government has (Qian & 
Roland, 1998). 
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Third, provincial governments in China consider privatization decisions based on 
their economic benefits. During China’s transition process, some provinces have been 
more exposed to market forces and have performed better than other provinces (Child & 
Tse, 2001; Krug & Hendrischke, 2008). Today’s local governors in China are still 
evaluated by the business and economic outcomes they macro-managed in their 
individual provinces. Hence, SOE assets-sell is one key component of the provincial 
policy.  
China is an appropriate setting to study the role of power imbalance among the 
SOEs, the central government, and the provincial governments during privatization. 
Evidence shows that fewer than 90 SOEs are directly owned by the central government of 
China, while the majority of the SOEs are owned by provincial governments (State 
Assets Supervision and Administration Committee of China, 2008). Hence, this research 
setting offers a very important dimension on the central-local government power 
imbalance and its impact on SOEs; China’s experience with privatization involves the 
process of the devolution of power from the central government to provincial 
governments (e.g., Emerson, 1962). 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY 
Overall, this study contributes to the literature in the following ways:  
First, this study examines privatization in a conceptual power hierarchy composed 
by a central government, provincial governments, and state-owned enterprises. The 
central government in China owns fewer than 90 SOEs, and that number is expected to 
further decrease. Most of the SOEs are owned and privatized by provincial governments. 
Therefore, evidence shows that privatization in China is designed by the central 
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government but implemented by provincial governmental owners. This highlights the 
potential contribution of China’s privatization experience: firms’ strategic actions are 
affected by the power imbalance between the central government and provincial 
governments.  
Specifically, through the framework of the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981), strategic actions of firms are explained by powerful social 
forces. Taken from the firm-centric unilateral perspective, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
predicted that organizations formulate strategies, either by complying external forces or 
by implementing defense mechanisms, in order to reduce uncertainty in acquiring 
resources. This prediction is puzzling if one considers the motivation of the powerful 
constraining party (e.g., the government owner in the setting of privatization) to agree to 
relinquishing one’s power and the political and personal favorable exchange conditions 
that accompany the control (e.g., selling assets to private investors). Hence, adding the 
government-SOE bilateral power exchange dynamics (Emerson, 1962), this study 
contributes to the literature of external control of organizations from the power imbalance 
dimension. Power, by definition, is not an attribute of a firm or of an owner of the firm 
(Emerson, 1962). Power actually describes the interdependencies of all the social actors 
in a larger system. Figure 1 shows the power imbalance among these factors in China. 
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FIGURE 1  
The Theoretical Power Map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, the extant research on privatization has oversimplified reality by focusing 
only on profitability measures as the dependent variable. Although the research based on 
such outcome simplification has generated significant contributions to our understanding 
of privatization across countries, the relationship between privatization and firm 
performance (as the outcome of privatization) is contradictory, with empirical works 
from different disciplines reporting conflicting results. For example, studies from finance 
and economics (based on stock market datasets worldwide) have demonstrated that firm 
performance after SOEs’ privatization improved both in developed (D’Souza et al., 2005) 
and developing countries (Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami, 2005a; Sun & Tong, 2003); 
however, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) found that earnings improve prior to 
privatization but decline afterwards. The main analytical difficulties behind these 
findings lie not only in terms of the challenging task of specifying two complicated 
SOE Organizational Factors 
A State-Owned Enterprise 
Central Government 
Provincial Government 
Provincial Governmental Factors 
 
Defense Mechanisms 
 
Central-Provincial Government 
Power Asymmetry 
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systems of corporate governance and organizational performance, but also in terms of a 
lack of methodological techniques to isolate environmental characteristics and to 
overcome sampling selection bias. If only efficient SOEs have a high likelihood to be 
privatized, there is no wonder these firms’ efficiency outcomes improve afterwards, 
because those less efficient SOEs were never sold to private owners (i.e., less efficient 
SOEs did not enter the sample of privatization researchers) (Greene, 2007; Kennedy, 
2006; Wooldridge, 2002, 2008). Thus, in order to tackle the sample selection bias and 
control for external environment effects, I included both groups—privatized firms and 
firms that remain state-owned—in one sample and designed a study to conduct the panel 
data analyses by differentiating influences from various factors.  
Third, the management literature has limited empirical evidence documented on 
the topic of privatization from an organizational perspective. Finance studies, however, 
have emphasized the function and liquidity of capital markets (e.g., Megginson & Netter, 
2001; Megginson et al., 2004; D’Souza et al., 2005). In addition, privatization researchers 
in the field of finance collected samples based on either developed or developing 
countries (Boubakri et al., 2005b) or based on English common law or French civil law 
countries (La Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). There are 
relatively few studies on privatizations that occurred in transition economies previously 
adopting Soviet legal systems (Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005; La Porta et al., 2000). China, 
however, is presently one of the largest economies in the world and the largest transition 
economy (Allen et al., 2005). Hence, this dissertation adds to our understanding about 
strategic actions and organizational transformation of SOEs in transitional economies 
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(Hoskisson, Wright, Lau, & Eden, 2000; Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004; Luo, 2001; 
Miller, Li, Eden, & Hitt, 2008; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). 
Fourth, this study offers a distinct view of China, a classical example of a 
transition economy. Most of the SOEs are owned and privatized by provincial 
governments in China. This is an interesting perspective because, so far, privatization 
studies have been dominated by samples from the United Kingdom, Russia, and Europe. 
Privatization in the United Kingdom, Russia, and Europe, however, is designed and 
implemented by central governments. In Russia, for example, the Healthcare Ministry 
decides whether to sell SOEs in the healthcare sector, and the Railway Ministry decides 
whether to sell SOEs in the railway sector enterprises (Frye & Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Basically, Russian local governments have very little power over the 
privatization policy, even though the focal sold SOE is located in their region (Qian, 
Roland, & Xu, 2006). Hence, this study adds a complementary dimension on central–
local government power imbalances and their impacts to SOEs. 
Organizations are open systems that are constrained by external power forces. 
Firms formulate strategic decisions to either comply with demands of external actors 
and/or implement defense mechanisms (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008). The 
event of privatization has switched the direction of satisfying political demands of 
governmental authorities to creating consumer-perceived benefits. Privatization is 
therefore a unique context for examining the power imbalance among different groups of 
external actors.  
Interestingly, during the course of this research, governmental owners in both the 
United States of America and the United Kingdom have been purchasing majority share 
14 
 
 
 
equities and implementing direct controls over large-sized firms in multiple industries 
(e.g., AIG, CitiGroup, GMC, and Royal Bank of Scotland) in order to stabilize the 
financial condition of these firms and stimulate their market economies. So the inter-
dependencies and power imbalances between governments and firms are not exclusive 
phenomena in transition economies only. For the purposes of economic development and 
social stability, governmental owners are still playing important roles even in developed 
economies today. Therefore, the theoretical and managerial applications from transition 
economies may shed light on the future empirical studies based on advanced market 
economies.  
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Relevant research 
streams about privatization in finance, economics, and strategic management are 
reviewed in Chapter II. The chapter summarizes contributions and limitations of previous 
research on the topic of privatization (i.e., what we know and what we do not know) and 
sets the stages for the theoretical framework developed in Chapter III. In Chapter III, a 
theoretical framework is developed and hypotheses are presented. Chapter IV presents 
the methodology and research design used for hypothesis testing. Sample, measurement 
issues, and model specifications based on panel-data are also discussed. Findings are 
exhibited in Chapter V, and Chapter VI offers a discussion of the results reported in 
Chapter V. Implications, limitations, and future avenues for additional research emerging 
from this study are also presented in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The overall objective of this chapter is to provide a review of extant research and 
to demonstrate the limitations of previous alternative theories and models vis-à-vis the 
present dissertation. This chapter comprehensively reviews relevant research streams 
about privatization in different disciplines of social science (e.g., economics, finance, 
international business, and strategic management) and summarizes these academic 
contributions into three categories: (1) overview of privatization; (2) outcomes of 
privatization; and (3) determinants of privatization.  
There are three reasons to organize this literature review chapter in such a way. 
First, privatization has been an established topic in the fields of economics and finance 
for over two decades. Hence, economists have offered many insights about this topic 
from a variety of perspectives. It is essential to capture the academic contributions from 
related disciplines comprehensively and then summarize them in the review section. 
Second, cross-discipline literature indicates that the empirical efforts of financial 
economists have been focusing on the outcomes of privatization. This is actually a major 
characteristic in the privatization literature. Hence, a separate section of outcomes of 
privatization deserves scholarly attention. Third, there are relatively fewer studies to 
investigate the determinants of privatization. Thus, a section of determinants of 
privatization appreciates these existing academic findings and informs the field what we 
do not yet know.   
The chapter concludes by arguing that there is great promise in using well-
established theories in the field of management to analyze SOE–governmental-owner 
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power imbalance relationships in the context of privatization. From the perspective of 
determinants of privatization, this dissertation focuses on the role of power imbalance of 
different governmental owners in the privatization process of SOEs in transition 
economies. 
OVERVIEW OF PRIVATIZATION   
Policymakers and scholars continue to debate the merits of privately-owned and 
state-owned enterprises, especially given the current global financial crisis and 
government-initialized economy simulation plans across different countries (e.g., the U.S. 
and the U.K.). From the government perspective, there are a few economic reasons to 
privatize SOEs: (1) raise revenue by selling assets; (2) promote efficiency of SOEs; (3) 
reduce government intervention in the economy; (4) expose SOEs to market discipline; 
and (5) introduce competition (e.g., Megginson & Netter, 2001; Price Waterhouse, 1989).  
The efficiency gain was adopted by researchers to justify the above economic 
reasons. Proponents of privatization report that newly privatized firms perform better in 
terms of accounting-based measurements (e.g., profitability, capital investment spending, 
and output increases; Megginson & Netter, 2001). For example, when comparing the pre- 
and post-privatization financial and operating performance of 61 firms from 18 countries 
through public share offerings from 1961 to 1990, Megginson, Nash, and van 
Randenborgh (1994) documented performance improvement and corporate governance 
enhancement. Based on empirical evidence across different countries, Megginson et al. 
(1994) further found that objectives of governments (e.g., employment rates and taxes) 
have been met by adopting privatization programs.  
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Not all scholars agree with the above conclusion, though. For example, by using 
cross-country panel data on 500 large firms, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) found that 
earnings improved prior to privatization but declined after privatization. In addition, Kole 
and Mulherin (1997) reported that private sector firms do not produce better performance 
than the U.S. federal government-owned SOEs in the same industry. By drawing samples 
from firm performance during and after World War II, their findings directly challenge 
the argument of efficiency gain as a result of privatization.  
Governments, as state owners and asset sellers, normally choose one of the three 
modes to privatize: asset sales, share issue privatization, or voucher privatization 
(Megginson et al., 2004). With an asset sale, the seller sells the ownership of the 
underlying SOE to a private investor. This privatization technique is usually implemented 
through an auction. La Porta and Lopze-de-Silanes (1999) reported an important 
privatization program in Mexico that relies on asset sales. In share issue privatizations 
(SIPs), the government seller sells equity shares in the public capital market. Jones et al. 
(1999) reported that governments in 59 countries had raised over $446 billion in the 
1990s through privatization.  
Voucher privatization, another technique, has been adopted in formerly 
communist countries such as Russia and the Czech Republic because of the low income 
levels in those countries. Basically, the government distributes vouchers (e.g., paper 
claims that can be exchanged for ownership of formal SOE firms) to every citizen. 
Voucher privatization is therefore adopted by the government to develop capital markets 
and liquidity in that country. Especially in transition economies, low income levels center 
the domestic investors’ financial capability (Megginson et al., 2004).  
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Overall privatization is a very important element of the increasing use of the 
market mechanism, instead of the state intervention, to allocate resources globally 
(Megginson & Netter, 2001). Various approaches have explored the theoretical 
framework to interpret the complex phenomenon of privatization, starting with the 
finance and economics literature.  
Political Objectives, Public Choice, and Executive Leadership 
In the literature of public choice, researchers argue that rent seeking, extraction, 
and social welfare protection are important objectives of government intervention (e.g., 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Stiger, 1971). Therefore, a stream of political economy research 
considers that public enterprises have had poorly motivated leaders. Because those public 
enterprises separated the formulation and implementation stages of executive leadership, 
the results have been weakened for SOEs. For example, there were 35 government and 57 
privately funded expeditions to navigate the North Pole between 1818 and 1909. Most 
Arctic discoveries were made by private ones, while most tragedies were publicly funded 
(Karpoff, 2001). Besides poor leadership, slow adaptation to new information and lack of 
incentives are two major problems associated with public enterprises, even though those 
public ones were better funded.  
Another research stream (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994), however, proposes a 
bargaining model among the treasury, the politician, and the manager of a firm to solve 
the puzzle: do privatizations matter? Shleifer and Vishny (1994) showed that 
privatization of cash flows encourages effective restructuring of public enterprises, which 
implies that the potentially profitable firms are the best candidates for privatization, 
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whereas the ―hopeless‖ firms continue providing political benefits in exchange for 
government subsidies.    
Overall, economists largely belong to the public choice school and believe that 
public enterprises produce products desired by politicians rather than by consumers. For 
example, Credit Lyonnais, a state-owned bank in France, lost billions of dollars making 
dubious loans to the socialist party’s friends. Hence, public enterprises are asked to 
pursue political goals for politicians. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) further 
proposed a formal mathematical model of privatization by pointing out that privatization 
of public enterprises raises the cost to politicians of influencing those firms because it is 
politically harder to control privatized firms. In this way, privatization leads to efficient 
restructuring of firms. Moreover, privatization is more effective when combined with a 
tight monetary policy, and when the new owners of firms are profit-maximizing investors 
(Boycko et al., 1996; Qian & Roland, 1998). 
Information Asymmetry and Asset Underpricing 
Information asymmetry theory explains the underpricing in initial public offerings 
(i.e., the return on the issue price on the first trading day of listing) because first-hand 
investors do not know the underlying assets as much as the original owners of the 
company (Loughran, Ritter, & Rydqvist, 1994). Basically, studies of initial public 
offerings (IPOs) all conclude that initial offer prices are significantly lower than early 
after-market prices (e.g., see also Certo, Holcomb, & Holmes [2009] for a recent review 
of IPOs). However, the average level of underpricing in the initial SIPs is similar to that 
for private-sector IPOs (Jones et al., 1999). This is interesting because most SOEs are 
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large and well known, not only to professional investors but also to the general public in 
that country.  
The puzzle of underpriced privatizations of SOEs starts with the United Kingdom. 
Jenkinson and Mayer (1988) showed that the underpricing on U.K. privatization sales is 
greater than the average initial public offerings, even though investors know more about 
the well-established SOEs than most private initial public offering companies. 
Mathematical models and analytical tools are offered to explain gradual, underpriced 
privatization sales of SOEs. By applying the information asymmetry theory, financial 
economists show that underpricing may be used as a signal for initial public offerings and 
gradual asset sales (e.g., Welch, 1989). Empirical evidence also shows that the sales of 
SOE firms in Hungary were surprisingly gradual (Perotti, 1995).  
Another dimension is that the government retained significant shareholdings in 
privatized firms after having relinquished control. This dynamic behavior of the 
government was interpreted in the following way: a partial sale and its underpricing are 
signals of government commitment, because gradual sales with immediate relinquish of 
control implies that the government bears the residual risk of the firm (Perotti, 1995; 
Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). Because the government understands the uncertainty and 
information asymmetry involved with SOEs, underpricing serves as a signal of 
government commitment to buyers. Based on the theoretical framework of Perotti (1995), 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) compared private IPOs and fixed-price privatizations in 
eight countries: Canada, France, Hungary, Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Thailand, and the 
U.K. Interestingly, only the U.K.’s evidence supports the government commitment 
hypothesis of Perotti. The Canadian and Malaysian evidence solidly rejects this 
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hypothesis. Overall, their results show that the mean pricing of IPOs of privatized SOE 
firms are the same as IPOs of private-owned firms.   
As the debate continues, financial economists devote more efforts to cross-
country, large-sample empirical studies. By using 59 country samples of 630 SIPs with 
total proceeds of over $446 billion between 1977 to 1997, Jones et al. (1999) found that 
governments consistently underpriced share issue privatization offers in order to advance 
political and economic policy objectives. These authors offered an alternative explanation 
for the underpricing of SIPs is that governmental authorities design the privatization 
offers in order to achieve political and economic policy objectives instead of to maximize 
proceeds, supporting Perotti’s (1995) view that government commitments help to conduct 
credible privatization.  
The Choice of Public versus Private Capital Markets 
Finance researchers generally believe the function of one country’s capital 
markets reflects the country’s institutional characteristics and corporate governance 
systems (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). Therefore, the 
choice of whether to privatize through a public stock market (i.e., share issue 
privatization) or through the private capital market (i.e., direct sales) is an important 
question. Of course, price theory in formal economics would posit that the choice is 
based on in which way the seller (in this case, the government) can receive the best price 
for the underlying assets. However, as previous discussion suggests, government 
commitment to develop a capital market is also a consideration.  
Megginson et al. (2004) combined World Bank and Privatization International 
databases to indentify 2,457 privatizations that happened between 1977 and 2000. Of the 
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2,457 privatizations, 931 were through public stock markets and 1,526 were though 
private market (i.e., direct sales). Results show that the nature of the capital market in the 
privatizing country is the key to the choice. If the focal country has a less developed 
capital market and the government has the commitment to use privatization to develop its 
national market’s liquidity, the SIPs are more likely to occur. Subrahmanyam and Titman 
(1998) argued that SIPs can jumpstart stock-market development and speed up gains in 
economic growth and efficiency. Also, SIPs are more common when income is more 
equally distributed in a country. Megginson et al.’s (2004) results also suggest that 
governments that have less state control over the economy tend to use direct asset sales. 
That is because investors are more willing to make substantial investments when they 
perceive that they are able to maintain the ownership of those assets without undoing 
government intervention.   
Controlling Blockholders and Legal Systems 
Recently Atanasov (2005) showed that in a country with very little mechanism to 
protect the rights of minority shareholders or to constrain majority owners, institutional 
investors-controlled block shareholdings are valued ten times higher than minority shares. 
This observed control premium in Bulgaria implied a strong preference of controlling 
blockholders. Using World Bank data of 1,491 privatized firms in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Claessens (1997) also reported that voucher prices and secondary market 
prices are shown to depend upon the ownership structures. The more concentrated 
ownership leads to higher equity prices. Together, these findings support the international 
law and economics approach pioneered by La Porta et al. (1998): countries with weak 
legal protections for minority shareholders create the context of controlling blockholders.  
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Furthermore, a country-level study by Johnson, Smith, and Codling (2000) 
showed that poor legal protection leads to controlling blockholders’ self-interested 
behaviors, and that this can explain the stock market and foreign currency collapse in the 
Asian crisis. Hence, the above studies support the theory that dispersed ownership and 
high minority shareholder valuations cannot emerge when there is no sufficient legal 
control over controlling blockholders. This stream of research supports the view of Fama 
and Jensen (1983) that says that firms with a majority shareholder cannot exist as 
publicly traded organizations in equilibrium because unconstrained majority owners can 
and will fully expropriate all assets and cash flows from the firm, at the cost of minority 
shareholders. Due to the proliferation of controlling shareholders in most countries (La 
Porta et al., 1999), the premium of control blockholders adds value to the literature of 
corporate governance and privatization.  
Partial Privatization and Residual State Ownership 
Overall, there are limited works done on partial privatization, because a much 
larger percentage of privatizations involved with both share issue privatization and direct 
asset sales normally have a majority of assets privatized and control rights transferred 
from the state to private owners. By examining recent partial privatization in many 
countries, however, some researchers offered their conclusions. 
In India, in cases where the government remained the controlling owner, Gupta 
(2005) concluded that partial privatization improved firm performance, mainly because 
of the role of the stock market. By using an unbalanced panel data of Indian SOEs and 
also controlling for endogeneity, Gupta (2005) found that partial privatization had a 
positive impact on both profitability and productivity, supporting the theory that the stock 
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market still can play a role in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even 
though the governmental authorities remain as the controlling owners. According to 
Gupta, the role of the stock market is to provide a valuable signal in the market for 
managerial skills, given that the controlling rights of the firm remain in the governments’ 
hands. The reason is that the stock performance may be used by workers and lower-level 
managers to monitor senior executives since all workers depend on the performance of 
the firm. More importantly, stock prices may also be used by the government to monitor 
managers more effectively since the share price is used as an objective standard for SOE 
executives’ performance evaluation and compensation package. In short, Gupta’s (2005) 
theory supports the view of La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) because better 
information and monitoring reduce inept practices of senior managers.   
Vaaler and Schrage (2009) focused on partially privatized firm-level shareholder 
returns in the telecommunication sector, after the state-owner reduced shareholding 
percentages of the controlling majority and shifted to non-controlling minority equity. 
Those authors focused on the impact of residual state ownership on the firms after the 
partial privatization decisions were made by state-owners. They posited that the residual 
state ownership may positively rather than negatively influence the firm stock market 
performance, which is measured by cumulative abnormal rates of return. By using 15 
privatizing telecoms in Latin America and following 196 announcements from 16 years, 
these authors showed that residual state ownership caused by partial privatization 
positively affected short-term shareholder returns after state-owners decided to privatize 
firms, mainly for two reasons: (1) partial privatization signaled state support for 
managerial initiatives; and (2) partially privatized firms improved principal-agent 
25 
 
 
 
alignment of private shareholders and management interests in the long term. In the 
future research section, these two authors acknowledged that the context in China is the 
promising avenue for research because of its institutional characteristics.  
Sun and Tong (2003) evaluated the performance changes of 634 SOEs listed on 
China’s capital markets upon partial privatization in the period of 1994–1998. These 
authors found evidence of improvements in earnings, real sales, and employee 
productivity up to three years after privatization. However, both return on sales and 
earnings on sales declined after privatization, supporting the view that partial 
privatization in China has only achieved limited success. Sun and Tong (2003) viewed 
partial privatization as a main problem caused by public policymakers, in contrast to 
Gupta’s (2005) conclusion, because the state controlling ownership still prevents non-
state shareholders from playing a more active and positive role in the firm. Hence, those 
authors suggested that state shares in China should be further reduced and more foreign 
institutional investors are needed.  
Also, Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) studied 790 partially privatized firms in 
China. About 27% of the CEOs in their sample were former or current government 
officials. Defining a political connection as a member of any legal party in China 
Mainland, those authors found that firms with politically connected CEOs underperform 
those firms that CEOs are not politically connected in terms of earnings growth, sales 
growth, and return on sales. The evidence offered in their paper is consistent with the 
traditional ―grabbing hand‖ argument (see also Shleifer & Vishny, 1998) that 
governmental authorities extract resources from SOEs that are under their direct control 
to fulfill objectives other than just profit maximization. Interestingly, the post-
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privatization underperformance study based on the China sample contradicts Gupta’s 
(2005) theory of the role of the stock market generated from the Indian stock market.  
Strategic Fit and Merger 
Strategic management researchers have shown an interest in investigating 
privatization and improved performance beyond the mere ownership-change effects 
(Uhlenbruck & De Castro, 2000). As previous discussion suggests, formal economics 
theory suggests that the transfer of ownership from state to private investors improves 
financial performance while considering a firm as a black box and privatization as a type 
of asset transaction. Since the process of organizational transformation is ignored in the 
economics literature, researchers have good reason to question whether the improved 
performance is due to external conditions (e.g., environmental change, technological 
advancement), rather than the change of ownership per se.  
In order to address the transformation process of privatized firms, Uhlenbruck and 
De Castro (2000) examined privatization when the government was considered a partner. 
Their research setting was in Central and Eastern Europe, where many foreign diversified 
firms have merged with SOEs based in these Central and Eastern Europe countries. As 
the traditional merger theory suggests, the fundamental constructs affecting merger 
outcomes are the strategic fit and organizational fit between two firms (Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986; Lubatkin, 1983). In fact, the government, as a seller, is not going to just pursue 
selling price maximization as a single objective through privatization, as formal 
economics theory would suggest. Through the privatization process, the government is 
obligated to ensure economic development as well as multiple political and social 
considerations. Therefore, governmental authorities, as a partner of a merger project, can 
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still enforce state goals after privatization because they control many of the country’s 
resources and have responsibilities to formulate industry policies and regulate business 
systems.     
Hence, the ongoing communications and the strategic fit between the seller (the 
government) and the buyer (the foreign diversified firm) determine the outcomes of the 
privatization, such as price, integration strategy, and post-privatization performance. 
Uhlenbruck and De Castro (2000) made a good first step toward examining those 
characteristics of privatization. Their results showed that the strategic fit (measured as 
industry commonality or a vertical relationship between targets and acquirers) was 
positively and significantly associated to post-privatization performance. Their findings 
were based on 170 survey questionnaires and the key dependent variable, post-
privatization performance, was a perception measure of return on asset.  
Contextual and Organizational Factors of Privatization 
As the research on privatization has accumulated empirical evidence about 
improved efficiency from finance and economics, the field of management adds 
theoretical understandings about organizational perspectives. For example, Cuervo and 
Villalonga (2000) pointed out that both agency theory and public choice theory do not 
explain the observed variance in the performance results of privatized firms, even though 
both two theories indicate that privatized firms’ performance will improve generally. 
Interestingly, Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) argued that organizational and contextual 
variables should be considered in order to explain such a variance. By contextual factors, 
these authors mean deregulation and liberalization of the local economy in which the 
privatized firm is based. By organizational factors, these authors mean the top 
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management replacement and changes of goals, strategies, and cultures. By including 
those two categories of factors, these two authors offered a conceptual model to explain 
the variance of the performance for privatized firms.  
Other scholars have suggested that significant entrepreneurial progress occurs 
during the privatization process through a cognitive shift from a managerial cognition 
toward an entrepreneurial cognition. Managerial cognition refers to a more systematic 
decision-making (Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial, 2000). However, most of the so-
called ―Red Directors‖ of the former Soviet Union tended to be all powerful within their 
enterprises, and these Red Directors’ main job was to implement government-planned 
economic decisions (Puffer, 1994). Therefore, this type of command economy-based 
managerial cognition does not generate positive effects on firms’ competitive advantages. 
Based in cognitive psychology, entrepreneurial cognition indicates that strategic 
decisions are shaped by individual heuristics and that an understanding of strategic 
decision-making is significantly limited without analysis of these cognitive processes 
(Hitt & Tyler, 1991).  
In the field of management, there are other scholars who have developed 
conceptual models about privatization from different perspectives, such as institutional 
theory (Johnson, Smith, & Codling, 2000), multilevel analysis (Ramamurti, 2000), local 
partner collaboration (Doh, 2000), and agency theory (Dharwadkar, George, & Bradnes, 
2000). For example, the speed of privatization can be considered a balance between the 
destruction of the command-based institutional system and the creation of the market-
based institutional system (Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000). Through the lens of 
Spicer et al. (2000), an entrepreneurship based upon the incremental institutional shift 
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explains privatization outcomes better at the country level because a gradual reform 
process allows the formation of market-based institutions (e.g., property rights and 
minority shareholder protection) to evolve gradually from the inherited planned economy 
system. Mass privatization does not lead to the formation of a new system of 
entrepreneurship based on market-based institutional settings because a market-based 
institution system cannot be established immediately right after a firm is sold. Therefore, 
mass privatization does not avoid the restructuring of institutions because it only 
postpones the challenges of implementations of those restructurings. Hence, scholars 
have concluded that balance should be maintained ―through a process of gradual property 
reform that shows recognition of the importance of existing economic and social relations 
while still allowing for the emergence of new forms of market entrepreneurship and 
organization‖ (Spicer et al., 2000: 646).  
OUTCOMES OF PRIVATIZATION 
Overall, literature indicates that the empirical effort to generate valid and 
comprehensive conclusions about outcomes of privatization continues:  
1) Megginson et al. (1994) studied privatizations during 1961 to 1989 and 
documented performance improvement and corporate governance 
enhancement.  
2) Boubakri and Cosset (1998) included privatized firms based in low-income 
countries and lower-to-middle-income countries during 1980 to 1992. 
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) concluded that newly privatized firms show 
significant increases in profitability, capital investment spending, and output. 
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Their research also suggests that privatization yields greater benefits for firms 
headquartered in countries with higher income per capita.  
3) Considering the operating environment for electric utilities and 
telecommunications firms, which changed dramatically during the 1990s (due 
to external factors such as massive technological changes and the worldwide 
trend of deregulation of utilities), D’Souza and Megginson (1999) studied 
privatizations during 1990 and 1996. The pre- and post-privatization financial 
and operating results showed that the 85 firms in the sample experienced 
significant performance improvement.  
Basically, the three empirical studies mentioned above examined different time 
periods (1961 to 1989 for Megginson et al. [1994]; 1980 to 1992 for Boubakri & Cosset 
[1998]; and 1990 to 1996 for D’Souza & Megginson [1999]). With relatively little 
sample overlap, collectively the studies examined 211 firms from 42 countries and 
generated consistent results. In addition to the empirical evidence generated from 
different countries, the following section summarizes a variety of theories adopted by 
scholars in the privatization outcome research.  
Agency Theory and Firm Performance 
Managers are considered agents of both privatized firms and non-privatized firms. 
Managers’ goals presumably seek the maximization of their own utility rather than that of 
the firm or its owners. In private firms, this orientation divergence is effectively reduced 
because of the following mechanisms: (1) the threat of takeover (market for corporate 
control) and bankruptcy; (2) the incentives of monitoring by the board of directors 
representing profit-maximizing investors; and (3) the managerial labor market. In the 
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state-owned firms, there are no such mechanisms to reduce moral hazards. Hence, private 
firms are more efficient than state-owned ones after political and organizational factors 
are controlled (Villalonga, 2000).   
According to Kornai (1992), SOE managers have strong incentives to acquire and 
hoard resources under their control simply because doing so enhances their bargaining 
position with the state authorities, who also can be considered as agents of the general 
public. Under the state-owned institutional system, while managers control business 
decisions, residual claims against the income of those enterprises are due to the general 
public in that country. Theoretically, the individual claim of an individual citizen is so 
small that no one is interested or capable of monitoring the behaviors of managers. So, 
privatization is used to reduce agency considerations. Hingorani, Lehn, and Makhija 
(1997) find that equity value is positively and significantly correlated with the size of 
insider and foreign ownership structure in the voucher scheme, supporting the view that 
insider and foreign ownership mitigate agency problems.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) attributed poor performance of SOEs to the principal-
agent problem. In this situation, the separation problem involves the general public 
(owners or taxpayers) and politicians (agents). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
the politicians retain control rights to the firm without cash flow rights because the latter 
are dispersed among all the citizens in a country. Hence, in SOEs, politicians’ interest is 
to achieve political objectives. Privatization, as a fundamental change of ownership, 
triggers an emphasis on profits.     
Following Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) theory that ownership concentration is an 
internal governance mechanism in countries in which minority shareholder protection is 
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weak, some financial economists considered privatization as a natural experiment to 
examine how corporate governance mechanisms interact and affect organizational 
performance in the post-privatization stage (Boubakri et al., 2005a). Boubakri et al. 
(2005a) included firm- and country-level explanatory variables from a panel data of 209 
firms privatized in 25 emerging markets and took into account unobservable changes 
across years (i.e., fixed effects modeling). These authors concluded that the positive 
relationships between ownership concentration and firm performance matter more in 
countries with weak investor protection. However, as these authors acknowledged, one 
potential limitation of their study could be that the sample completely excluded ex-
communist countries (i.e., transition economies).  
Industry Effects and Product-Based Performance 
As the above studies suggest, researchers generally believe privatization improves 
efficiency of the firm that has been privatized. Megginson et al. (1994) found that firms’ 
profits improved after privatization. In order to overcome the limitation of accounting-
based measurements (e.g., Barber & Lyon, 1996), Eckel, Eckel, and Singal (1997) 
employed data from both the stock market and the product market. They showed that 
stock prices of U.S. competitors, at the industry level, fell a significant 7% upon British 
Airways’ privatization. Therefore, the industry effects were clear and robust. Further, as 
the product price of the airway market, airfares served by British Airways fell 
significantly upon privatization.  
The merit of the industry effect approach is that it investigates the outcomes of the 
government decision-making from the industry level. Eckel et al. (1997) employed a 
simultaneous equation multivariate regression based on seemingly unrelated regression 
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estimator (SUR) because the entire industry is affected by privatization simultaneously; 
in other words, the firm-specific disturbances are significantly correlated and therefore 
should be counted.  Thus, the industry effect approach contributes to the literature not 
only in terms of industry-level analysis, but also by employing stock market data as well 
as product market data.    
Post-Privatization Governance 
The pre-privatization corporate governance and resource relocation in transition 
economies (e.g., China and Russian) were based on the state ownership of all means of 
production, which allowed the governmental authorities to extract investable resources 
from the overall economy by systematically distorting the allocation of resources (Li, 
1997). Hence, state-owned enterprises maintained monopolistic positions because 
monopoly power made it easier for managers and workers of SOEs to pursue ―a quiet life‖ 
(Hicks, 1935).    
Privatization improves corporate governance because it allows the market rather 
than government authorities to allocate resources. Along this logic, Filatotchev et al. 
(2001) considered ―export intensity‖ as the outcome of a strategic decision-making 
process for post-privatization firms based in Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus. These 
authors developed a straightforward research question: How do privatized firms develop 
an exporting strategy? Because the voucher privatization programs in Russian, the 
Ukraine, and Belarus are designed to increase firm efficiency (e.g., Megginson & Netter, 
2001), making products internationally competitive is a logical strategic outcome of the 
privatization. In other words, privatization can be considered a tool to remove constraints 
on managerial strategic decision-making imposed by state ownership. Filatotchev et al. 
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(2001) considered exporting intensity, rather than strategic intent, as an outcome because 
it represents the consequence of the judgment of the international product marketplace. 
By using three-year longitudinal questionnaire data, Filatotchev et al. (2001) found that 
export intensity was mediated by strategies involving product development, acquisitions, 
and links with foreign partners.  
Barberis et al. (1996) used a survey of 452 Russian shops to measure to what 
extent privatization promotes restructuring as the outcome variable. In their study, 
restructuring was measured as major renovation, a change of suppliers, an increase of 
office hours, and layoffs. The likelihood of restructuring, as the dependent variable, was 
significantly associated with the presence of new owners and new managers. The 
evidence of their study supports the important role of new human capital in 
organizational transformation because privatization fundamentally changes the selection 
criteria for new managers from political-based skills to market-based skills. The 
methodological advantage of this work is that these authors used a two-stage least-square 
modeling and three instruments (e.g., privatization techniques) to control potentially 
endogenous variables. Those instruments were strongly correlated with ownership and 
management change but not correlated with the four dependent variables of restructuring, 
thus enhancing the validity of the study.   
Besides exporting and restructuring, other outcomes of privatization include post-
privatization integration and transition (Uhlenbruck & De Castro, 1998), change of 
performance evaluation and compensation systems (Rodriguez, Espejo, & Cabrera, 2007), 
and failure (Mouly & Sankaran, 2004). By adopting qualitative methodologies, strategic 
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management researchers have contributed to the literature of corporate governance and 
strategic outcomes of privatization.  
Overall, the economics and finance literature have discussed different techniques 
of privatization (share issue privatization, voucher, or direct asset sales) in different 
countries (Megginson et al., 2004; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988), while the strategic 
management research has addressed the strategic outcomes of privatization (De Castro & 
Uhlenbruck, 1997).  
As economists point out, for less-developed and former communist countries, 
privatization also involves development imperatives (Vernon, 1988), which were missing 
from the first wave of privatization in the U.K. Hence, this type of characteristic 
distinguishes former communist countries, less-developed countries, and developed 
countries. De Castro and Uhlenbruck (1997) classified 467 privatizations worldwide 
between 1989 and 1992 into three groups: developed countries, less-developed countries, 
and former communist countries. Results of this study show that privatization deals in 
former communist countries are more likely to be total equity acquisitions than 
privatizations in less-developed and developed countries. Also, results suggest that 
privatization deals are more likely to be total equity acquisitions in former communist 
countries because of lower levels of government credibility and higher levels of 
intangible assets. Also, privatized firms in former communist countries are more likely to 
acquire related businesses than buyers in either developed or less-developed countries.   
Resource-Based and Market-Based Views 
Makhija (2003) considered privatization of SOEs in the Czech Republic as a 
natural context to test and compare the predictive ability of the resource-based view 
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(RBV) against the market-based view (MBV) under conditions of major changes. The 
market-based view is based on industrial organization economics and posits that entry 
barriers and privileged end-product market power are the basis of above-normal returns 
(Bain, 1956; Caves & Porter, 1977; Porter, 1980). In contrast, the resource-based view 
focuses on firms’ internal resources and capabilities to explain firm value, competitive 
advantage, and profitability (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959). The results support the 
conclusion that resource-based variables make more significant contributions to the 
model.  
Entrepreneurial Outcomes of Privatization 
Zahra et al. (2000) pointed out that little scholarly attention has been given to the 
organizational and managerial implications of privatizations or the consequences of 
privatized firms’ capability to innovate. These pioneers identified the fact that prior 
management research has not examined the major organizational transformation that 
occurs following the event of privatization. Organizational transformation is defined as 
―changes in organizational values, cultures, systems, and strategies‖ (Zahra et al., 2000: 
510). Hence, the organizational transformation centers on to what extent a firm is 
governed and managed as it heads in the direction and faces the competitive realities of a 
market-based resource allocation mechanism.  
Entrepreneurial outcomes include innovation and new venture. As some scholars 
highlight: 
Innovation is the creation of goods and services, where product innovation also 
includes upgrades and extensions of existing products (incremental innovation). It 
also includes radical new product development. Whether radically new products 
or modified products, both innovations are necessary to capitalize the 
technological opportunities created by liberalization of the economy and the 
resulting privatization. (Zahra et al., 2000: 518)  
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DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATIZATION 
As the previous literature review suggests, scholars have been providing both 
empirical works and formal mathematical analyses on the topic of outcomes of 
privatization (e.g., Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Megginson & Netter, 2001). These 
empirical studies from multiple disciplines have examined the outcomes of privatization, 
such as efficiencies, share price, export intensity, product price, and major restructuring. 
Interestingly, however, the research question of what factors have triggered government 
owners to relinquish the exclusive control over their SOEs (i.e., determinants of 
privatization) has attracted surprisingly scarce scholarly attention.  
Drawing samples from Central and Eastern Europe, Goel and Budak (2006) 
concluded that greater economic prosperity, greater unemployment, and lower inflation 
seem to induce small-scale privatization but have little effect on large-scale privatization. 
These two authors studied country-level factors (e.g., country size, size of the 
government, and unemployed rate) and a number of exogenous influences (e.g., backup 
from the former Soviet Union).  
In investigating the market-based economy development in China, federalism and 
soft budget constraints are considered as two possible antecedents of privatization (Qian 
& Roland, 1998; Cao, Qian, & Weingast, 1999). Qian and Roland (1998) demonstrated 
that the government’s incentives to bail out inefficient projects were determined by the 
trade-off between political benefits and economic costs. The economic costs were 
dependent on the decentralization of the government fiscal policy. According to these 
authors, decentralization follows this logic: (1) China’s central government designed 
decentralization fiscal policy; (2) decentralization of fiscal authority therefore allows 
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local governments to keep the government revenue within their regions for local 
economy developing purposes; and (3) because the local government is allowed to keep 
the local revenue, the local government has incentives to bail out inefficient projects. 
Interestingly, however, other researchers have different views regarding soft budget 
constraints (Kornai, 1980). For example, in an empirical study, Earle and Estrin (2003) 
found that soft budget constraints might induce asset restructuring (e.g., privatization), 
but the effect was small and insignificant.  
Based on anecdotes and a few case studies, Cao et al. (1999) studied the 
privatization of small firms (i.e., the county-level township and village enterprises) and 
extended the logic of decentralization. Basically, Cao et al. (1999) proposed that the 
harder budget constraints and increased competition from the non-state sector are the 
antecedents of township enterprises’ reform and privatization. However, Cao et al. (1999: 
107) acknowledged that ―[The conclusion] should not be interpreted as systematic‖ 
because of the data limitation.  
Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the answer to why some SOEs are 
privatized but others remain state-owned is still a puzzle. In fact, of the many questions 
privatization researchers have attempted to answer, the questions focusing on the 
determinants of privatizations are among the most complex. As the above literature 
review suggests, governments around the world often sell SOEs selectively and employ 
complicated sale transactions. In other words, government authorities decide when and 
how to sell what type of firms. Hence, it is logical to assume that the post-privatization 
firm performance is determined, at least partially, by whether governments decide to 
privatize efficient SOEs (or less-efficient SOEs). In other words, how the privatization 
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decision is made by the governmental owner determines the post-privatization firm 
performance. 
In addition, the privatization literature may contain three potential limitations:  
1) Most outcome studies do not include firms that have not been privatized (i.e., 
firms remain as SOEs) in their sample. Technically, it is relatively easier to 
compare accounting-based measurements (e.g., profitability) of pre- and post-
privatization for a group of firms. However, a common critique will be 
whether those performance outcomes in terms of profitability are driven by 
external environment factors such as cost of capital or technological 
innovation, rather than the transfer of ownership.  
2) Empirical efforts have not explained what factors determine why some firms 
are privatized and many others are not. This determination of the likelihood of 
privatization is critically important in research methodology and validity of 
findings because it might suggest a sample selection bias in the current 
literature.  
3) Theoretically, the efficiency measures (e.g., profitability) do not explain the 
logic that pre-privatization SOEs are evaluated by the state, rather than by 
consumers. SOEs can be very efficient at pleasing government authorities 
when they are not very efficient at meeting customer demands. It is 
organizational transformation caused by privatization that switches the 
emphasis of those SOEs from meeting political demands to satisfying 
consumer wants. Because most finance authors consider the firm as a black 
box, the conventional analytical approach and the design of the efficiency 
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measure as the dependent variable cannot isolate the contextual factors’ 
impacts.    
As simulated by previous studies, I examine the determinants of privatization in a 
context of the transition economy by developing a nested conceptual model that accounts 
for external factors and organizational factors. Organizational transformation is the key of 
privatization. During this type of strategic change process, the privatized SOE firm starts 
to focus on consumers in the marketplace. Before privatization, the SOE firm, by 
definition, focuses on securing resources from governmental authorities. As resource 
dependence theorists suggest (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), a market-based mindset 
replaces a political-based mindset in privatized firms; the market-based mindset 
emphasizes the upgrade of product lines, the growth of revenue, and the conducting of 
marketing penetration strategies. Before privatization, however, these product 
development decisions might not have been implemented because the objective of SOEs 
is dominated by political and social factors (e.g., social welfare or local employment) and 
therefore the business strategies to respond to the consumers are constrained and 
eliminated.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
It is safe to draw several conclusions from the research undertaken so far. The 
roles of (1) organizational transformation of SOEs, and (2) governmental-owner power 
imbalance have been largely overlooked in the privatization literature. Therefore, the 
field has limited understanding of the theory and antecedents that determine the 
likelihood of privatization. Such a research gap is surprising given the significant 
strategic changes and consequences involved in privatization across different countries.   
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Because research on the topic of privatization and its antecedents has been sparse, 
more effort is needed to advance the development of relevant research. In order to 
address this gap, the privatization decision is the focus of this dissertation. Different 
branches of government owners have different interests and power asymmetries to make 
such a decision. Hence, this work investigates three categories of relationships: (1) the 
relationship between the immediate government owner and the SOE; (2) the power 
asymmetry among different government authorities; and (3) the relationship between the 
defense mechanisms firms adopt and the likelihood of privatization.  
Overall, privatization mitigates constraints on managerial strategic decision-
making imposed by exclusive state ownership. Hence, this dissertation considers multiple 
factors from three categories (SOE organizations, provincial governments, and the central 
government) for two groups of firms (privatized firms and remaining SOEs), rather than 
just focusing on the efficiency outcome for one group (privatized firms). This nested 
conceptual model may help to advance our understanding about the topic of privatization.    
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
SOEs are firms that have governmental owners as decision-makers (e.g., board of 
directors). By nature, the strategic decision-making system is very ineffective for these 
SOEs because governmental owners exercise sufficient power in strategic decision-
making. For example, if an SOE wants to spin-off (i.e., sell) a subsidiary, executives of 
that firm have to receive approval and the selling approach from their governmental 
owners/authorities. Governmental officials have multiple political and social objectives, 
and generally they are not interested in understanding competitive advantages of 
individual firms. Therefore, they are not good managers, and they are highly unlikely to 
risk their political capital for such business decisions. In reality, this type of decision-
making process could take as long as five years in transition economies. Therefore, the 
direct government intervention (e.g., very slow decision-making mechanism) actually 
presents SOEs with competitive disadvantages and inefficiencies.  
In the field of strategic management, researchers believe that power provides its 
holder the ability to achieve a high level of influence on the behavior of other actors in a 
business system (e.g., Kim et al., 2004; Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). Resource 
dependence theorists share the same concept and posit that the dependency of a firm 
towards its external forces is the source of power and also its conceptual obverse, 
constraint (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 2003). If these external actors are 
relatively concentrated, a focal organization has few alternative ways of acquiring 
resources to sustain its competitive advantage or even to survive. So when the 
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dependence on the particular resource obtained from a concentrated source is high, the 
focal firm will be more constrained and prone to meet any demands of those powerful 
external actors. In turn, if an SOE is capable of acquiring critical resources from the 
product marketplace by meeting increasing demands from its customers, then it does not 
really need to secure resources from its governmental owners. On the one hand, when 
power is imbalanced in a SOE organization, this may motivate this firm to escape the 
exclusive control of its owners and be privatized. On the other hand, the elimination of 
external constraints such as decentralization of fiscal policy, if adopted by different 
governmental owners, significantly affects strategic actions of focal firms in the setting of 
privatization.  
Evidence suggests that the antecedents of privatization, especially in transition 
economies, involve very complicated factors including the governmental-owner power 
imbalance, local-economy development, and organizational factors. Despite a number of 
studies that have been done on the topic of privatization in the field of management, very 
few studies investigated privatization from the power imbalance perspective. Therefore, 
the relationships between privatization and power imbalance between SOEs and their 
governmental owners require future investigation.  
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This dissertation examines privatization as an outcome of a power hierarchy 
composed of the central government, provincial governments, and SOEs. According to 
the resource dependence theory, organizational controls and strategic actions are the 
outcomes of powerful social forces (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Viewed from this 
perspective, firms reduce their uncertainty in acquiring resources either by complying or 
by implementing defense mechanisms. Reducing uncertainty for SOEs is particularly 
complex during a privatization, considering the motivation of the governmental owner 
that sets the conditions of privatization. For example, the government may agree to sale a 
firm to private investors in return for fulfilling complicated political and social purposes. 
Hence, by adding the government–SOE power dependence (Emerson, 1962), this study 
extends the predominantly firm-centric focus of the resource dependence theory. 
In order to explain the likelihood of privatization, this study proposes a bilateral 
approach to study antecedents of privatization. Figure 2 highlights the hypotheses of this 
study. The power asymmetry between the central government and provincial 
governments, the power dependence between SOEs and their immediate provincial 
government owners, and defense mechanisms adopted by SOEs are presented in an 
organizing theoretical framework.  
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FIGURE 2  
The Theoretical Framework of Hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the setting of the power hierarchy, the power asymmetry is among three groups 
of social actors: SOEs, provincial governments, and the central government. The central 
government designs the market-based resource allocation system and the decentralization 
fiscal policy and therefore allows local governments to keep the government revenue 
within their regions. Provincial governments own the SOEs, and therefore they utilize the 
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economic rents generated from the SOEs for the social and economic benefits in their 
individual provinces. The strategic objectives of the provincial government owner 
include relatively high-quality products with lower prices, high percentage of local 
employment (hire more workers even though SOEs are already overstaffed), and higher 
output levels with fixed resource inputs (higher regional GDP contribution). As one can 
see here, those strategic objectives imposed by provincial government owners constrain 
the performance of SOEs, misappropriate SOEs’ vital resources, and even damage 
competitive advantages of these firms. Hence, SOEs have to design a set of defense 
mechanisms to manage interdependencies with both provincial government owners and 
the central government (e.g., Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Katila et al., 2008).  
This study aims to extend the resource dependence theory by analyzing power 
imbalance between SOEs and different governmental authorities. Despite mounting 
references to The External Control of Organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), resource 
dependence theory is considered more of an appealing metaphor instead of a framework 
of testable empirical research (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Some ambiguities in the 
original external control model account in part for this limitation. First, the central 
proposition of the resource dependence theory is that organizational survival and major 
strategic behavior hinge on a firm’s capability to secure critical resources from the 
external environment. Taken from the firm-centric unilateral perspective, Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) predicted that organizations formulate strategies, either by complying 
with external resource providers or by implementing defense mechanisms, to restructure 
their dependencies with a variety of powerful social actors/forces in order to reduce 
uncertainty in acquiring resources. This prediction is puzzling if one considers the 
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motivation of the powerful constraining party (e.g., the government owner in the setting 
of privatization) to agree to relinquishing one’s power and the political and personal 
favorable exchange conditions that accompany the control (e.g., selling assets to private 
investors). Second, because the original model of resource dependence is considered 
unilateral, empirical tests of power dynamics and constraint absorption have exclusively 
focused on the dependence of one social actor on another, without considering the 
reciprocal dependency from a bilateral perspective (e.g., government owners and SOEs).   
Therefore, the main source of ambiguity for empirical studies on the resource 
dependence theory may partially come from the original discussion (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), which did not clearly distinguish the bilateral power dynamics that emerged from 
Emerson’s (1962) exchange theory. Power, the key attribute of the resource dependence 
theory, is not a characteristic of any individual firm or any individual government owner. 
In the research setting of privatization, power is located in the system of a conceptual 
map, as a bundle of social relations that contains all the state-owned enterprises, the 
central government, and provincial governments. Therefore, the bilateral approach of this 
study, by integrating with the bilateral power exchange theory and by theorizing the 
reciprocal power dynamics and resource dependence, extends the resource dependence 
theory.  
HYPOTHESES 
SOE Organizations 
 Based on the above discussion, impactful research questions (e.g., privatization) 
arise not only because organizations are merely dependent on their environment, which is 
composed of external actors, but also because this environment is not completely 
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dependable and is changing continuously. For example, the supply of certain critical 
resources for the firm becomes more or less scarce. The central logic in the resource 
dependence framework is that organizations acquire resources in order to survive to the 
extent that they are effective. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 2) summarized that 
―organizational effectiveness derives from the management of demands, particularly the 
demands of interest groups upon which the organizations depend for resources and 
support.‖ Hence, acquiring resources by meeting demands of interest groups captures the 
core logic of the resource dependence theory. Organizational strategic actions are not just 
a function of the firm or its internal procedure or leadership. Organizational strategic 
actions are also consequences of contingencies and constraints deriving from their 
environment.  
By definition, organizational effectiveness is ―an external standard of how well an 
organization is meeting the demands of the various groups‖ (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 
11). The effectiveness of an organization indicates its ability to secure resources and 
create desired and acceptable outcomes. Beyond a very small number of SOEs that 
provide exclusive government products and services (e.g., defense sectors), most SOEs 
acquire resources mainly from the governmental owner (e.g., capital) and from the 
product marketplace (e.g., revenue).   
SOEs develop and implement strategies to acquire resources from their 
governmental owners because one major difference between SOEs and other firms is that 
SOEs can request fiscal inputs directly from their governments. However, government 
provided capital and other resources come with a cost because governmental owners may 
impose constraints for SOEs, such as high output level and more employees. These 
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constraints weaken the competitive advantages of the firm. SOEs that are effective in 
acquiring resources in the product marketplace as well, however, are more likely to 
escape the control of their local government owners. Furthermore, their effectiveness 
may motivate their owners to privatize them due to their potential of generating income 
and providing products and services to customers. Hence: 
Hypothesis 1a: The degree of organizational effectiveness of an SOE in meeting 
customer demand is positively associated with the likelihood of its privatization. 
The above hypothesis suggests that SOEs desire autonomy and self-sufficiency. 
The resource dependence theory supports this hypothesis because the pattern of 
dependencies between an SOE and its external powerful actors predicts its strategic 
consequences and decision-making mechanisms. The strategic consequence is that 
organizations will tend to comply with those interests from external actors who have 
relatively more power. Thus, dependence actually translates into constraint, and the 
exercise of management discretion in those organizations (i.e., SOEs) becomes 
fundamentally weakened. For example, in reality, it takes a few years for one SOE to 
convince its government owners that it should spin-off a subsidiary. In other words, 
SOEs have to incorporate government owners in any major business strategy formulation 
and implementation. Privatization is, therefore, the clear indicator for the constraint 
mitigation.  
In contrast to effectiveness, organizational efficiency is defined as an internal 
standard that firms are doing better (or worse) on the business activities they have been 
doing (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Hence, it is clear that external forces and demands on 
an organization can be absorbed internally as requests for greater organizational 
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efficiency. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 13) noted, ―One of the most important 
influences on an organization’s response to its environment is the organization itself.‖ 
Then, if one takes the framework of organizations as power coalitions, it is logical to 
view an organization itself as a market aggregated for a variety of influences and controls.  
In fact, many scholars view firms as social instruments with power coalitions and 
idiosyncratic energy and efficiency (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1962; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Therefore, organizations alter their strategic purposes and business 
domains to accommodate newly emerged interests coming from different coalitions. One 
critical issue here is to what extent firms control their efficiency and for what purposes 
(Perrow, 1972). In this conceptual context, the organization itself is the setting in which 
all the internal participants (e.g., managers and employees) make contributions in 
meeting demands of external power coalitions.  
One fundamental dimension of achieving a higher likelihood of survival, then, is 
the controls and influences that emerge from the interactions of organizational internal 
participants and the financial metric valuation of their contributions. Because the ability 
to meet demands of external coalitions increases to the extent that the firm maintains 
itself as a social instrument in order to support its business operations, organizational 
efficiency can be considered another important and complementary factor in the context 
of privatization.  
In fact, what type of firm (i.e., efficient SOE versus inefficient SOE) is being 
privatized is a critical question worthy of investigation. If more efficient SOEs have a 
higher likelihood of being privatized, it is natural that their efficiency outcomes increase 
afterwards because the less-efficient SOEs never were privatized. Hence, the efficiency, 
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as a determinant of privatization, could offer insights about the post-performance in the 
setting of privatization. 
When a firm is capable of controlling the interactions of its internal participants, it 
may improve its odds of survival. Governmental owners might see organizational 
efficiency as a sign that an SOE can survive under market conditions (Cuervo & 
Villalonga, 2000). A macroeconomic benefit of organizational efficiency is an SOE’s 
ability to keep employment levels high. Governmental owners may be particularly 
interested in employment and other benefits and be supportive of privatization of efficient 
SOEs. Hence:      
Hypothesis 1b: The degree of organizational efficiency of an SOE is positively 
associated with the likelihood of its privatization. 
For the past five decades, a central passage in strategy research has focused on 
how firms acquire and leverage resources from the external business environment (Gulati 
& Singh, 1998; Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2009; Penrose, 1959; Rangan & Sengul, 
2009).  This study investigates the reciprocal effects between governmental owners and 
SOEs. For focal SOE organizations, their governmental owners make the final 
privatization decisions. Therefore, the understanding of the bilateral relationships 
between SOEs and their local governmental owners are worthy of investigation. 
Provincial Governmental Owners 
 There are two distinct theoretical dimensions of resource dependence: power 
imbalance, or the power differential between the organization and its external actors, and 
mutual dependence, or the sum of their dependencies (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). In 
fact, based directly on Emerson’s exchange framework, the dependence of an external 
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actor (i.e., the provincial government) to the organization (i.e., the SOE) is the reverse of 
an SOE’s dependence on the provincial government. In turn, dependence is a function of 
resource criticality and the availability of alternative providers of critical resources.  
Central to Emerson’s theory is the notion that ―power is a property of the social 
relation; it is not an attribute of the actor‖ (Emerson, 1962: 32). This logic implies a clear 
portrayal of power relations in a triad and reminds us of the simultaneous consideration 
of the power dependence of the SOE in relation to its provincial governmental owners 
and the power dependence of the provincial government to the SOE. Thus, the 
simultaneous consideration yields two distinct dimensions: power imbalance and mutual 
dependency. Power imbalance and mutual dependence have been empirically tested in 
order to advance the resource dependence theory (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Steensma, 
Barden, Dhanaraj, Lyles, & Tihanyi, 2008). According to scholars, power imbalance 
captures the difference in the power of each actor over the other, while mutual 
dependence captures the existence of bilateral dependencies in such a relationship, 
regardless of whether these two actors’ dependencies are balanced or imbalanced. 
Interestingly, mutual dependence is the main focus in the literature, while power 
imbalance is largely ignored.  
In the setting of privatization, while governmental owners rely on SOEs to 
generate the desired economic outcomes, governmental owners also actively and 
systematically attract foreign direct investment (FDI) projects to their provinces. The 
provincial GDP growth ratio is the critical performance indicator and political 
achievement for every provincial governor. In fact, both SOEs’ output (i.e., production in 
economic terms) and FDI inflows contribute to the regional GDP growth. As a region’s 
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FDI projects grow, the regional government may rely less on SOEs for desired regional 
economic development. FDI projects may bring modern management, innovation, and 
organizational capabilities to the region, while some SOEs may be troubled by structural 
problems that have been accumulating over decades. If FDI projects generate additional 
economic outputs with modern technology and management, local governments have less 
incentive to keep SOEs under exclusive control. Hence:  
Hypothesis 2: The size of FDI projects in a province is positively associated with 
the likelihood of an SOE’s privatization. 
Because provincial governmental owners supervise many SOEs in multiple 
industries in their individual regions, they normally are not interested in knowing how to 
create a competitive advantage for every single firm (Boycko et al., 1996). These 
governmental owners generally make capital and asset allocation decisions by referring 
to the aggregated measure of asset competitiveness of one sector in each province. As 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) pointed out, governmental owners pursue multiple objectives 
including political ones and economical ones. Like a nationwide ranking index, 
competitiveness of assets in one sector increases the provincial governmental owner’s 
―political score‖ and chances to be promoted into the central government. Hence, it 
decreases the likelihood of privatization. For example, these governmental owners attend 
the national industrial annual conferences in different sectors. Therefore, each provincial 
governmental owner compares the sector-specific asset competitiveness within its own 
province with the asset competitiveness of the same sector from other provinces.  
In order to utilize the political benefits, these owners of local governments will be 
reluctant to sell assets in a competitive sector. Therefore, competitiveness of assets in one 
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sector (e.g., the pharmaceutical sector) may influence the decision of relinquishing 
control (e.g., privatization) made by provincial governmental owners.  
Uncompetitive assets, as resource absorber SOEs in certain provinces, are no 
longer capable of generating desired returns and other related economic gains for 
government owners. Therefore, governmental owners have incentives to sell these SOEs 
by means of privatization. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3: The regional sector competitiveness in a province is negatively 
associated with the likelihood of an SOE’s privatization. 
Power Asymmetry 
 One big challenge of economic reform and state asset restructuring in any 
country can come from policy constraint. In transition economies with an unbalanced 
magnitude of regional economic development, national policies are important in shaping 
asset restructuring strategies and determine the dynamics of the central–provincial 
government relationships. In fact, aligning the interests of local governments with their 
individual market and economy development is the important national policy formulated 
by the central government (Qian & Roland, 1998). The positive relationships between a 
provincial government’s fiscal incentives and the provincial market development have 
been tested and supported by some scholars who specialize in development economics 
(Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 2005).  
Privatizing state-owned assets can be seen as a critical component in the overall 
national policy package if a central government has been transferring a planned economy 
to a market-oriented economy (Megginson, 2007; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). Creating 
thriving markets in every province of one country requires transforming a centralized 
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government into one that supports the local market in each region and therefore fosters 
decentralized economic activities (Jin et al., 2005). By devolving power from the central 
to provincial governments, the central government can incrementally formulate an 
effective policy of privatization in every province. For example, Hayek (1945) discussed 
the use of knowledge in society by emphasizing that local governments have better 
access to local information, which allows local governments (rather than the central 
government) to provide better public goods and services that fit local preferences. 
Drawing on this logic, Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) built a theory of fiscal 
federalism to highlight the importance of the alignment of government revenue and 
expenditures to improve the overall national economic development.  
The dynamics among the central government and the provincial governments in 
transition economies (e.g., China) have been observed by scholars worldwide. For 
example, Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000) documented a positive correlation between 
provincial economic performance and a provincial governor’s holding of a seat on the 
Party Central Committee. In this case, a better economically performing province (e.g., 
Jiangsu) will have much more discretionary decision power compared with a poorer 
economically performing province (e.g., Guizhou). Li and Zhou (2005) also found 
evidence that the central government uses personal control over the promotion or 
dismissal of provincial governors to increase local economic growth. Therefore, the 
provincial governments have unequal power in the country. The power of a provincial 
government comes from its fiscal strength and its provincial economic performance.   
Because the majority of the SOE organizations in China are owned by provincial 
governmental owners, one main concern is the fiscal incentives that affect provincial 
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governments’ decisions (e.g., privatization) to promote market-oriented development in 
the local economy. Specifically, one crucial issue is to what extent the central–provincial 
governmental power asymmetry affects a provincial government’s decision regarding the 
privatization of SOEs owned by provincial governments. The literature from the public 
economics and development economics shows that the decentralized fiscal incentive, as 
one pro-business policy formulated by the central government, promotes local business 
development in every province (Jin et al., 2005).  
Hence, provincial governments with less revenue have less discretion in deciding 
and implementing policies on their own. Higher power at the level of central government 
may lead to faster realization of policies at that level, including privatization. Therefore, 
more government revenue generates more power asymmetry for the provincial 
government in the system of central–provincial government hierarchy. Thus, these 
provincial governments have more power that can lead to much more freedom and 
discretion in deciding state asset policies. Hence:  
Hypothesis 4: The power asymmetry between the central government and the 
provincial government (e.g., higher power of the central government) is positively 
associated with the likelihood of the privatization of SOEs. 
As some scholars recently suggested (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009), Pfeffer 
and Salancik’s (1978) most commonly overlooked chapter is ―The Created Environment: 
Controlling Interdependence through Law and Social Sanction‖ (Chapter 8). Through the 
resource dependence framework, in analyzing strategic actions of firms, one can argue 
that organizations reduce uncertainty and external constraint either by absorbing the 
interdependence or by negotiating an arrangement that adequately manages the power 
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dependence. However, it is important to acknowledge that sometimes external power 
systems and environmental contingencies are beyond the control of focal organizations. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 189) noted that ―when dependence is not capable of being 
managed by negotiating stable structures of inter-organizational action, organizations use 
yet one other class of strategies‖ and that ―faced by unmanageable interdependence, 
organizations seek to use the greater power of the larger systems‖ in order to ―create for 
itself an environment that is better for its interests.‖  
Defense mechanisms include strategies that smaller technology firms adopt in 
order to mitigate uncertainty and to offset constraints imposed by large corporations as 
their investors/owners (Katila et al., 2008). In fact, larger corporations, as owners of 
newly founded technology ventures, have multiple objectives over these focal firms. 
Accessing the technology of new ventures is a major objective. Therefore, new 
technology ventures are at a particular risk of facing resource misappropriation. This is 
because the established corporations’ motivation, which is based upon such an owner-
firm relationship, could result in utilizing the new firm’s technological resources for the 
larger corporations’ own benefits. In order to protect the vital resources, the focal new 
firm uses defense mechanisms such as patent and share placements to maintain its power 
(Katila & Mang, 2003). For example, if the new firm offers new shares to another 
investor, then the power of the established large corporation is diluted. Patents are 
considered another effective defense mechanism because the technological resource, 
through patent coverage, is protected by a powerful legal authority (Katila & Shane, 
2005). 
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This same defense mechanism applies in the relationship between the SOE and its 
governmental owner because the SOE is unable to completely reduce uncertainty and its 
interdependence on the provincial governmental owner. Hence, firms have to undertake 
another set of strategies to protect their vital resources from these environmental 
contingencies. In doing so, as Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggested, firms actively seek 
to ―create‖ their defense mechanisms to secure their vital resources and competitive 
advantages.  
In fact, the bilateral dynamics that focus on the power to control and/or to shape 
an organization’s strategic objectives are not new. The fundamental issue in any 
organization is how firms overcome the constraints of interdependence imposed by 
external actors on their ability to exercise discretion. Basically, the literature on external 
control of organizations has followed Emerson’s (1962) exchange theory of power-
dependence relations by stressing the control of key resources and strategic decisions as 
the critical foundation of asymmetric leveraging between organizational actors. Therefore, 
if constrained dependence imposes limits on a firm’s performance, it is logical to expect 
firms in discretionary positions to try their best to minimize the constraints imposed on 
them by creating defense mechanisms in order to achieve ―balancing operations‖ 
(Emerson, 1962: 32).  
SOEs may use defense mechanisms or strategies to mitigate uncertainty and 
constraints imposed by their provincial governmental owners (Katila et al., 2008). In the 
Chinese pharmaceutical sector, provincial governments are the immediate owners of 
SOEs, but the central government evaluates patents and production quotas. In order to 
protect their critical resources, SOEs may develop defense mechanisms using the support 
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of the central government. In such a conceptual power map, the central government does 
not own most of these SOEs, and that is why the national decentralization fiscal policy 
was formulated in the first place. Therefore, it is the provincial government owners’ 
discretionary responsibility to decide when and how to sell these SOE assets 
incrementally. These defense mechanisms created by these SOEs, therefore, cannot 
effectively mitigate constraints of the local governments because of the direct oversight 
by these owners. Stronger defense mechanisms used by SOEs will motivate local 
government owners to hold their SOEs for longer periods of time. Hence:  
Hypothesis 5: The degree of an SOE’s defense mechanism to offset constraints 
imposed by provincial governmental owners is negatively associated with the 
likelihood of its privatization. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents a research design to test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 
III. Below, I present the research setting, the sample, measurements of variables, and 
analytical approach. 
TRANSITION ECONOMY 
A transition economy is an economy that is changing from a centrally planned 
economy to a free-market economy (Roland, 2000). Transition economies undergo 
economic liberalization, where market forces set prices rather than a central planning 
mechanism, governmental-owned enterprises are privatized, and a market-based financial 
sector and capital markets are created to facilitate the movement of private capital. The 
transition process has been applied in China, the former Soviet Union, Communist bloc 
countries in Europe, and many other countries (Roland, 2000).  
According to Roland (2000), the business environment for a pre-transition 
economy (i.e., a central planning economy) had certain characteristics:  
1) At the beginning of the transition process, ―the share of GDP derived from 
private sector activities was very small in all transition economies. It ranged 
from less than one percent in Russia and Hungary to about two percent in the 
former Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, compared with over 80 percent in the 
United States‖ (Roland, 2000: 232).  
2) Economic production occurred overwhelmingly in the public sector because 
few productive assets could be privately owned. Governmental owners not 
only played important roles in planning outputs and inputs of their enterprises, 
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but also directly intervened in enterprise strategies such as budgeting and 
CEO promotion.  
3) Price was not the key mechanism in resource allocation because the use of 
resources was determined by political decisions made by government 
authorities. Allocation of products was done by the planning authorities that 
directly organized production and exchange.  
Hence, these transition economies did not need market-based systems to raise 
government revenues because the government decided how to use total output and could 
simply appropriate production for its own needs. Therefore, the economy was macro-
managed by its government in the following areas: (1) the authorities’ knowledge—
available from the plan—of quantities of goods produced and of the prices at which they 
would be sold; (2) the role of the central bank in processing payments and loans and 
imposing restrictions on how these were to be settled; and (3) the concentration of 
economic activities in a few large state-owned enterprises as monopoly players (Tanzi, 
1992, 1999; Jin et al., 2005) .  
As many centrally planned economies have been transforming themselves into 
market economies, some economists specialize in transition economics (e.g., Roland, 
2000; Tanzi, 1999). These economists point out that the successful transition economies 
are the ones that have developed the necessary institutions and ensured a proper new role 
for the government. The transition process is usually characterized by the changing and 
creating of institutions, particularly private enterprises, as well as changes in the role of 
the government, and thus the formulation of fundamentally different governmental fiscal 
policies and the promotion of private-owned enterprises and markets. Overall, these 
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economists agree that the following are main objectives of transition: (1) creation of a 
competitive market and improve efficiency; (2) stabilization of the macro-economy and a 
correct functioning of the price mechanism; (3) better corporate governance arrangements; 
and (4) adequate government agencies to support a market economy. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF; 2000), the transformation of 
the economy requires that (1) the profitability of firms be the guiding criterion for most 
investment decisions; and (2) the government effectively performs its core functions in 
the economy system while withdrawing from, or drastically reducing its role in, many 
other activities. Specifically, the following are main attributes of the transition process 
(Roland, 2000): 
1) Liberalization—the process of allowing prices to be determined in free 
markets and lowering trade barriers to access the world’s market economies.  
2) Discipline over the government budget—requires the growth of money and 
credit (that is, discipline in fiscal and monetary policy) and progress toward 
sustainable balance of payments in a country.  
3) Restructuring and privatization—the creation of a viable financial sector and 
reforming the state-owned enterprises in these economies in order to make 
sure that firms are capable of producing goods that can be sold in free markets 
and of transferring their ownership into private hands.  
4) Legal and institutional reforms—the process of redefining the role of the 
government, establishing the rule of law, and introducing appropriate 
competition-based industry policies. 
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Transition processes can be idiosyncratic. Some nations have been experimenting 
with market reform for several decades (e.g., China), while others are relatively quick 
transformers (e.g., Republic of Czech). In some cases, reforms have been accompanied 
by political upheaval, such as the overthrow of a dictator (Romania), the collapse of a 
government (the Soviet Union), or integration with another country (East Germany) 
(Roland, 2000).  
Overall, from the literature of economics, while much has been written about the 
economic changes that must take place for centrally planned countries to become market 
economies, less has been written about how the strategic role of the government must 
change in order to enhance the competitive advantages of firms (i.e., former SOEs) in the 
new market-based business environment.  
PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR IN CHINA  
China is considered one of the largest economies in the world. The IMF places 
China’s 2006 purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted GDP at $9.98 trillion, nearly 77% 
of the U.S. GDP ($13.02 trillion) and 15% of the global total. With 1.4 billion citizens, 
currently China already has a huge pharmaceutical market. As Chinese national GDP has 
soared every year for the past 30 years, the consumer purchasing power per citizen 
increased significantly during the same period of time. Meanwhile, the demand for 
medical care for citizens living in rural areas of Mainland China is surging dramatically. 
According to ―China’s Health Statistics Highlight in 2005,‖ released by the Ministry of 
Health of China, the total amount of medical expenditures in China rose from RMB 14.3 
billion in 1990 to RMB 662.3 billion in 2003 (See also the No. 25 issue of Outlook 
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Weekly, edited by Xinhua News Agency, 2003). The potential for growth of the 
pharmaceutical market in China is obviously enormous. 
In the 1980s, China’s pharmaceutical industry was under tight governmental 
control. The government allocated all the resources for the firms, including financial 
capital (e.g., budgeting) and human capital (e.g., executive appointment). In the mid-
1980s, the government relaxed state control over the pharmaceutical industry, allowing 
marketized competition to develop among different firms. However, even in the late 
1990s, China’s heavily invested state plants remained tightly controlled by their 
governmental owners (White, 2000). These plants mainly produced relatively capital-
intensive ―upstream‖ intermediate pharmaceutical products, especially generic antibiotics 
that were off patent.  
Foreign investment in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry was permitted in the 
1980s. By the mid-1990s, following the open-door policy of the domestic industries, FDI 
projects had increased to a significant level. By 1997 there were a total of no fewer than 
1500 pharmaceutical joint ventures in China. All 15 of the world’s top pharmaceutical 
companies had set up joint ventures in China. The multinational firms brought 
technology and new standards of management to the Chinese pharmaceutical industry.  
The pharmaceutical industry is selected as the research setting (i.e., sampling) in 
my dissertation primarily for the following reasons:  
1) This industry is outside the strategic industries that the government does not 
want to privatize (e.g., utilities, banks, telecommunications, and steel). Also, 
SOEs in this industry were previously owned by provincial governments.  
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2) This industry has a governmental-ownership background. For example, e-
commerce firms compose a digital industry started without any governmental 
ownership, because the firms in that industry were mainly founded by local 
entrepreneurs.  
3) The size and implications of this industry are substantial for both advanced 
market and transition economies. 
SAMPLE 
The data for this dissertation are from four sources. First of all, I retrieved 
regional pharmaceutical industry data (database 1: RPID) from the Market Statistical 
Yearbook of China and China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook. This dataset 
contains variables that reflect the strategic competitiveness of different sectors in every 
province. Secondly, I obtained regional economic development data (database 2: SSB) 
from the China Statistical Yearbook that is published by the State Statistical Bureau and 
its brunches in every province of China. These yearbooks contain the regional GDP and 
government attracted foreign direct investment projects in every province of China. 
Although these datasets are comprehensive, they are not without limitations. Some 
scholars have used these datasets and published in leading journals such as Strategic 
Management Journal and Academy of Management Journal (e.g., Luo, 2001; Peng & 
Luo, 2000; Tan & Peng, 2003).   
I also obtained firm-level accounting-based objective measures (database 3: 
SFDA) from the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) in China. This dataset 
contains all the common financial figures of each firm in the pharmaceutical sector, such 
as total assets, sales, number of employees, and return on equity. The SFDA in China 
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collects organizational data for official purposes such as preventing faults and wrong-
doings. Data provided by the SFDA in China have been used in empirical research 
published in the Academy of Management Journal (e.g., White, 2000). In addition, the 
research design of this dissertation requires me to include both privatized SOEs and firms 
that remained state-owned in the same sample. There is no alternative dataset that can 
satisfy this requirement.   
Finally, I obtained the defense mechanism dataset (dataset 4: SMEI) of the 
pharmaceutical market in China from the Southern Medical Economic Institute of the 
SFDA in China. This dataset contains information of each firm’s patents and product line 
extensions each year.  
I used the SAS 9.1.3 data merge application to combine the above four datasets in 
order to have a panel dataset (e.g., cross-sectional and time-serious data structure) in 
which the unit of analysis was each firm (see Table 1). In other words, this was the firm-
level panel dataset grouped by year. There were about 1,648 observations in the sample, 
which included 206 firms (115 firms were publicly listed and 91 firms were non-listed) 
across eight years (2000 to 2007). I used the Stata 10.1 ―snapspan‖ function to further 
convert the snapshot data structure to the time-span data structure in order to prepare the 
survival analysis (Stata, version 10, page 93).  
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TABLE 1 
Constructs, Variables, and Data Sources 
 
Constructs  Variable Names  Possible Sources  Units  
Dependent variable     
Privatization  Privatized  Database 3: SFDA  Dichotomous   
Independent variables     
SOE Organizational Factors     
The organizational effectiveness 
The organizational efficiency  
BusinessGrowth  Database 3: SFDA  %  
RevenuePer  Database 3: SFDA  Chinese RMB  
Government-Owner Factors     
The average size of FDI projects  FDI  Database 2: SSB  Chinese RMB  
The provincial sector competitiveness  RegionaRoS  Database 1: RPID  %  
Provincial government revenue Govrevnue  Database 2: SSB  Chinese RMB  
Defense Mechanism  DefenseM  Database 4: SMEI  Count  
   
Control Variables     
Firm age  Age  Database 3: SFDA  Continues  
Total liabilities  Liabilities  Database 3: SFDA  Chinese RMB 
Return on equity  ROE  Database 3: SFDA  %  
Equity growth EquityGrowth  Database 3: SFDA % 
Deficit of the provincial government  Deficit  Database 3: SFDA  Chinese RMB                                                                                                       
The business munificence  
The industry effect is controlled because sample is 
based on one industry only 
GDPpercapita  Database 2: SSB  Chinese RMB  
MEASURES 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, the event of privatization, is a dichotomous variable. The 
value is 1 if the SOE has been privatized in a certain year between 2000 and 2007; the 
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value is 0 for the rest of the year. If the SOE has not been privatized during 2000 and 
2007, it is considered right-censored with all the zeros spanning eight years.   
In this study, there are three different situations of the privatization event for 
SOEs. First, if the SOE re-structures parts of the assets into a new firm and then lists the 
new firm in a stock market by selling shares to private investors, the listing is the 
indicator of privatization. Before listing, a SOE is 100% owned and exclusively 
controlled by the government owner. The listing represents a change in the ownership 
structure—the new, public shareholders now own a substantial fraction of the equity 
(Megginson et al., 2004; Villalonga, 2000; D’Souza et al., 2005). 
Second, in the Chinese setting, if the entire SOE went through the IPO and sold 
all the shares to other state investors (i.e., legal person shares), and then if those other 
state owners sold those non-tradable shares to private investors as tradable shares, then 
the selling of tradable shares is the indicator of privatization (Sun & Tong, 2003; Fan et 
al., 2007). This is because legal person shares are owned by domestic institutions that are 
state owned themselves. These so-called legal persons are typically investment arms of 
government agencies that helped in starting up the publicly traded firms by allowing 
access to financial resources (Sun & Tong, 2003). Legal person shares are non-tradable, 
and they are only transferable to other state-owned domestic institutions upon approval 
from China’s Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Therefore, one can point out 
that these non-tradable shares are still not owned by profit-driven private investors (i.e., 
asset striping), since privatization is defined conceptually as state-owned firms selling 
assets to private investors (e.g., Roland, 2000). Because privatization brings the discipline 
of the managerial performance monitoring role of the stock market into the organization, 
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the year when these legal person shares are sold to private investors are operationalized 
as the indicator of privatization.  
Third, for the non-listed firms, if the SOE sold shares to private investors (e.g., 
the executives of the previous SOE or other private firms), that sale is the indicator of 
privatization. For non-listed firms, it is harder to find a similar reference.  
In order to measure privatization more accurately and conservatively, I further 
operationalized privatization in terms of the percentage of the ownership of private 
investors as the following: The focal SOE is considered as privatized if the private 
investors own at least 25% of the total shareholding structure. There are two reasons:  
1) In theory, privatization brings the discipline and pressure from private 
investors to SOEs’ executives. The firm is no longer immune from private 
investor scrutiny after private shareholders own at least 25% of shares. From 
the government-owner perspective, it is politically unpopular to reverse the 
selling-share decision because the general policy formulated by the central 
government is to continue privatizing SOEs incrementally.  
2) The evidence across different countries suggests that privatization takes years 
or even decades to complete. Governmental owners follow the incremental 
pattern to sell assets because their goal is to sell over 50% of the shares, or 
even 100% of the shares. During the process, the SOE is already re-directed 
toward the market-based competition.  
The operationalization of this dependent variable is consistent with the previous 
evidence across different countries. Empirical evidence has shown that the sales of SOE 
firms in the United Kingdom and Hungary were both incremental and gradual 
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(Megginson, 2007; Perotti, 1995). There are two main reasons: (1) the size of all the 
SOEs could count as a substantial percentage of the nation’s GDP so that privatization 
involved complicated fiscal policy and market-based economy developing commitments 
from the government; and (2) governmental owners want to ―build a favorable market 
sentiment by gradually building investor confidence‖ (Boubakri, Cosset, & Smaoui, 2009: 
840). In other words, governments implement privatization in a way that they relinquish 
the control of SOEs in the first place but keep bearing the residual risk of their assets (i.e., 
credible privatization) for a while (Boubakri et al., 2009; Perotti, 1995; Vickers & 
Yarrow, 1988). Because the government understands the uncertainty and information 
asymmetry involved with the privatization of SOEs in transition economies, the initial 
sell of shares indicates government commitment to build a market-based mechanism. It is 
also politically unpopular to reverse the privatization action. Even though governmental 
owners still hold some shares of the firm, the top management teams of the privatized 
firms no longer report to governmental agencies or political parties. Evidence indicates 
that these firms act as private firms, while boards of directors serve as final decision 
authorities. 
During the past 15 years, empirical articles from leading journals (e.g., 
Administration Science Quarterly) have offered a rich source for predictors and 
constructs of power. Please refer to Appendix A for a summary. Specifically, the 
following measures were adopted for this dissertation. 
SOE Organizational Factors/Predictors  
The predictor (i.e., independent variable #1) for hypothesis 1A is organizational 
effectiveness in meeting increasing consumer demand. Revenue growth (e.g., {[Sales t – 
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Sales t-1]/ Sales t-1} is adopted as a proxy to measure to what extent the SOE can meet 
increasing customer demand from the product marketplace (i.e., the market-based 
channel for resources; e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). From the resource dependence 
perspective, SOEs mainly acquire resources from two channels: the government (the 
planning-based channel), and the product marketplace (the market-based channel). Firms 
that can successfully secure resources from the marketplace and show business growth 
rely less on resources from the government, and that may be the reason these firms try to 
escape from the governmental ownership via privatization.  
The predictor (i.e., independent variable #2) for hypothesis 1B is the 
organizational efficiency, which is sales per employee (i.e., total sales divided by total 
number of employees). SOEs are complex organizations and have to fulfill multiple goals. 
As a complementary proxy, this proxy measures to what extent the organization controls 
its interaction of internal participants (e.g., Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Perrow, 1972). 
Higher levels of efficiency indicate that the SOE can keep the employment level high and 
may improve its odds of survival in the market-based resource allocation system.   
Governmental-Owner Factors/Predictors 
The predictor (i.e., independent variable #3) for hypothesis 2 is the average size of 
FDI inflow projects. This is a proxy to measure to what extent the provincial 
governments attract foreign-invested projects into the province. Provincial governments 
that can successfully attract FDI inflow projects may rely less on regional GDP 
requirements generated by SOEs.   
The predictor (i.e., independent variable #4) for hypothesis 3 is the regional 
sector competitiveness. Regional sector competitiveness is the sector-specific return on 
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sales aggregated for all the SOE firms in one sector of one province (i.e., return on sales 
of the pharmaceutical sector in one province).  
The predictor (i.e., independent variable #5) for hypothesis 4 is the provincial 
government revenue in every province. This is the proxy for the power asymmetry 
between local governments and the central government (Jin et al., 2005). In fact, the 
provincial difference in terms of government revenue is substantial. This measure is a 
proxy that indicates the power asymmetry between the local and the central government 
(compared with other provinces) in such a power hierarchy.  
The predictor (i.e., independent variable #6) for hypothesis 5 is the defense 
mechanism. Given the political interests of these governmental owners (e.g., Perotti, 1995; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1994), provincial governmental owners have multiple objectives 
rather than a focus on profit maximization. Hence, the political intervention distorts the 
strategic objectives of SOEs. For instance, local governmental owners can ask the SOE to 
produce mass volumes of low margin drugs in order to increase local committee 
members’ healthcare satisfaction, even though the firm wants to research and innovate 
for higher margin and more profitable products. Therefore, the decision of the 
governmental owner can hurt the firm’s competitive advantage. Defense mechanisms can 
mitigate this misappropriation and help the SOE maintain its power in the relationship 
with its governmental owner. So when defense mechanisms are available, firms are more 
likely to form ties with a rather remote but helpful actor in order to protect their resources. 
Patent defense, therefore, is an effective defense mechanism (e.g., Katila & Mang, 2003). 
Defense mechanism is a count of numbers of patents and new products/procedures 
approved by the central government (Katila et al., 2008). 
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Control Variables 
There are seven control variables for this study. The first one is firm age. I 
consider the age of the firm as a control variable because the organizational inertia within 
firms may hinder firms to implement any major type of organizational transformation 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
The second control variable is total liabilities of the firm. I used the total 
liabilities for two main reasons: (1) as a size control variable, total liabilities and total 
assets are highly correlated (e.g., the correlation value =.9641 and is significant); and (2) 
total liabilities not only can control the size of individual firms, but also can take care of 
the cash-inflow pressures faced by firms in transition economies (Megginson et al., 2004). 
Therefore, total liabilities is a relatively better control variable over the variable of total 
assets.  
The third control variable is the return on equity. Return on equity has been used 
as the dependent variable in strategy research. In this study, however, it is conservative in 
order to control the effects of return on equity (e.g., Kim et al., 2004).  
The fourth control variable is the deficit of the provincial government. Local 
governments are the direct owners of SOEs. In the field of economics, studies done in 
Central and Eastern European countries have concluded that the government revenue 
deficit can be one of the main reasons for privatization. Therefore, I need to control for 
the provincial government revenue deficit (e.g., Megginson & Netter, 2001).  
The fifth control variable is the regional GDP per capita. As a variable of 
business environment munificence, GDP per capita provides a logical measure of the 
munificence in each individual province (e.g., Park et al., 2006). By assumption, resource 
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dependence theory considers firms as living entities that try to acquire and secure 
resources from the general environment. So, it is conservative to control the magnitude of 
general environment munificence because easier tasks faced by SOEs may reduce the 
likelihood of their privatization motivations.   
The sixth control variable is the equity growth (e.g., {[shareholder equity t – 
shareholder equity t-1]/ shareholder equity t-1}. Governmental owners can make asset 
allocation decisions that directly increase or reduce the equity of SOEs across years 
(Roland, 2000), especially when these governmental owners try to fulfill their political 
and social goals. Equity growth indicates whether governmental owners are willing to 
make public funding available to support future development of firms.  
Because the sample is drawn from the pharmaceutical industry only, the industry 
effect (i.e., the seventh control variable) is controlled. In addition, because I used the 
fixed-effects model, all the unobservable variables are controlled as long as they do not 
change over time (e.g., Allison, 2005).  
ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Survival analysis is considered an appropriate technique for examining the 
likelihood of an event as a hazard function of time-varying explanatory variables across 
years (Allison, 1995; Lancaster, 1979). In this study, I applied survival analysis to the 
time-span data by assuming that the duration, as in the amount of years that a firm spends 
before privatized, follows a stochastic process. In estimating the hazard model of 
privatization, I used the proportional-hazard specification, which is also a fixed-effect 
model known as the Cox model, to study duration functions to event (Allison, 2005).  
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The specification of the model depended on whether and how the hazard of a 
privatization varied across different years and as a function of my theoretical 
variables/regressors. This kind of modeling technique has been widely used in the field of 
strategic management (e.g., Iyer & Miller, 2008). In logistic and other exponential 
models, no dependence of the hazard rate on time is identified, which suggests the 
advantage of the duration function in this research context over logistic regressions 
(Allison, 2005; Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez, 2004). In addition, either the maximum 
likelihood estimator or the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator may be referred to as 
parametric methods because every aspect of the model, including time, is completely 
specified. The Cox model here, however, is referred to as a partially likelihood estimator 
or a semi-parametric model because the time function does not have to be specified (Cox, 
1972). Because I did not want to make any a priori assumptions about the baseline 
hazard rate, the Cox proportional hazard model was adopted. In short, the main advantage 
of the Cox model is that it can handle partial likelihood (PL) functions, and the PL 
method allows the equation to assume time dependence so that time need not be specified.  
The proportional hazards model assumes that hazard rates are a log-linear 
function of parameters for the effects of regressors. Its value for a firm i at time t, 
denoted by hi(t), is the following: 
hi(t) = h0(t) exp [ bk Xik (t)]                                                           (1) 
where h0(t), which represents the major dimension of time dependence, is called the 
baseline hazard function, and Xik (t), which may or may not depend on time, is the value 
of the kth regressor for firm i at time t. 
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The baseline hazard function is a common function for all firms. But when this 
equation is solved using Cox’s PL estimation method, the functional form of h0(t) is not 
specified (Allison, 1995, 2005). The PL estimates of parameters are obtained by 
maximizing the partial likelihood function. The PL function is given as follows: First, 
based on length of duration ti, subjects are ordered from the smallest to the largest 
duration. The subscript i in the formula below indicates the ith firm after the ordering is 
made. Then the PL function is formulated such that: 
                     𝑃𝐿 =   
ℎ𝑖 𝑡𝑖 
 ℎ𝑖 𝑡𝑖 𝑗≥𝑖
 
𝛿𝑖𝑖
𝑖=1
                                                                                     (2) 
where hj(ti) is the value of the hazard function for the jth firm at time ti, where ti is the 
time at which the ith subject had either the privatization event or the censoring, and i is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the ith subject had an event of privatization 
and 0 if the ith observation was censored. The  symbol is just a multiplication operator.  
By combining equation (1) with equation (2), the baseline hazard function h0(t) is 
canceled out between the numerator and the denominator. Hence, the PL function is 
written solely as a function of parameters for the regressors: 
𝑃𝐿 =   𝑒𝑥𝑝[ 𝑏𝑘(𝑋𝑖𝑘 𝑡𝑖 
𝑘
]/ 𝑒𝑥𝑝[ 𝑏𝑘(𝑋𝑖𝑘 𝑡𝑖 
𝑘
𝑗≥𝑖
] 
𝛿𝑖𝑖
𝑖=1
                                   (3) 
This dissertation used the proportional hazards models with time-dependent 
explanatory variables across eight years to estimate the likelihood of privatization of 
SOEs. Since all the explanatory variables vary by years for any firm in the sample (e.g., 
eight different values for return on equity in a firm in eight different years), the Cox 
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model obtains parameter estimates β by maximizing the following partial log-likelihood 
function: 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 =    𝑋𝑘𝛽 − 𝑑𝑗
𝑘∈𝐷𝑗
ln  exp⁡(𝑋𝑖𝛽)
𝑖∈𝑅𝑗
                                                 (4)
𝐷
𝑗=1
 
where j indexes the ordered failure times t(j) (j = 1, …, D). Dj is the set of dj observations 
that fail at t(j), dj is the number of failure at t(j), and Rj is the set of observations k that are 
at risk at time t(j) (i.e., all k such that t0k <  t(j) < tk).  
Under the Cox model, one assumption is that there are no tied event times, which 
means that all events of privatization occur in distinct periods. As we can see, even 
though it is a reasonable assumption in continuous-time data, it is often violated in 
discrete-time sets. Hence, I used the Efron method instead of the Breslow method (i.e., 
the default method of handling ties) as the analyzing strategy (e.g., Efron, 1977; Iyer & 
Miller, 2008; Klein & Moeschberger, 2003).  
Robust estimate of variance (Lin & Wei, 1989; Schoenfeld, 1982) was also 
performed to use the efficient score residual for each subject in the data for the variance 
calculation. Especially in this type of multiple-record, single-failure, survival-time data, 
the same subjects appear repeatedly in the risk pools; the robust calculation of variance-
covariance matrix accounted for the effects and made adjustments for unbiased 
estimations.  
It is critically important to test the equality of the survival functions across 
different groups. Hence, I stratified models based on publicly listed (or non-listed) to 
further reduce the number of tied events. By allowing the baseline hazard functions to 
differ for the groups identified, stratified estimation fits models that are under the 
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constraint of the coefficients of regressors being equal while the baseline hazard 
functions differ. I used stratified models to control for a categorical variable (listed firms 
= 1 and non-listed firms = 2) that may have a complicated form of interaction effects with 
time, without specifying the form of the interaction effects. Clearly, this is another major 
advantage of the Cox model (Martin, Swaminathan, & Tihanyi, 2007; Singer & Willet, 
2003).  
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for the 1,648 observations. 
Statistics indicated that multicollinearity was not a problem for most variables. The only 
substantial correlation is between ―provincial GDP per capita‖ and ―provincial 
government revenue,‖ and the value is .656. In order to ensure that multicollinearity was 
not a problem, I estimated separate models by using the organizational factors and 
government-owner factors and reported the results in separate tables. Recent empirical 
efforts in the field of management suggest that estimating models for a group of 
organizational regressors and another group of government-owner factors separately can 
avoid distorted parameter estimates by including redundant indicators (e.g., Iyer & Miller, 
2008).   
HYPOTHESES 
Table 3 on page 82 lists the results for the failure rate outcomes of hazard 
function modeling when organizational factors were adopted. Model 1 contains all the 
controls. For the purpose of demonstrating bilateral power imbalance from both 
organizational factors and government-owner factors, model 2 adds organizational factors. 
Model 3 adds the government-owner factors. Model 4 is the full model that contains all 
the controls, organizational factors, and government-owner factors. The presentation of 
the results focuses on the findings of model 2, model 3, and the full model (model 4) 
sequentially.
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TABLE 2 
 Means, Standard Deviations, and Pairwise Pearson Correlations 
a 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Privatization .088 .283 0 1 
            2. Firm Age 23.48 21.79 0 178 .013 
           3. Total Liabilities 48847.39 104999.9 126.9 1262078 .032 .139 
          4. Return on Equity .144 .405 -8.303 3.454 .015 -.037 -.055 
         5. Provincial Government Deficit -2602578 133986 -7609163 -249198 -.032 -.061 -.011 -.056 
        6. Provincial GDP per Capita 17905.97 12135.47 4549.219 57695 -.009 -.007 .063 -.058 .133 
       7. Organizational Efficiency 83.28 432.04 .061 6740.29 .022 -.065 .081 .018 .032 .210 
      8. Organizational Effectiveness .611 4.372 -1.000 75.530 .056 -.07 -.031 .015 -.019 .005 .009 
     9. Equity Growth 1.298 28.522 -21.121 828.090 .106 -.035 -.018 -.004 -.015 .020 -.006 .041 
    10. Provincial Average FDI Size 405.282 280.706 84.934 3634.62 .023 .008 -.001 .018 -0.308 .029 -.019 .011 .022 
   11. Defense Mechanism  15.524 27.214 0 270 .069 .107 .348 .001 -.089 .146 .012 .033 .022 .032 
  12. Provincial Sector 
Competitiveness 5.125 11.004 -43.37 61.40 -.003 -.006 .026 -.028 .138 .431 .053 .018 .020 .110 .067 
 13. Provincial Government Revenue 5919096 4442377 165843 21800000 .009 .066 .039 .008 -.242 .656 .113 .003 .068 -.047 .160 .248 
 
  
a  All correlations greater than .066 or less than -.066 are statistically significant (p < .05). 
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 Model 1 indicates all the control variables. Firm age is not significantly 
associated with the likelihood of privatization (z = 0.89 and p = 0.372), and total 
liabilities of the firm is not associated with the likelihood of privatization (z = -0.68 and p 
= 0.494). Return on equity of the firm (ROE), however, is marginally and positively 
associated with the likelihood of privatization (z = 1.84 and p = 0.065). Equity growth is 
positively associated with the likelihood of privatization (z = 5.68 and p = 0.001), while 
provincial government deficit is not significantly associated with the likelihood of 
privatization (z = 0.86 and p = 0.389). Finally, provincial GDP per capita is significantly 
associated with the likelihood of privatization (z = -2.05 and p = 0.040). The negative and 
significant z statistic may imply that easier tasks faced by SOEs (due to business 
environment munificence) may reduce the likelihood of their governmental owners 
selling them. The model fit is acceptable (log pseudolikelihood = -266.96 and Wald chi2 
= 43.20).  
From the SOE organization perspective, hypothesis 1a predicted that the 
likelihood of privatizations would increase with the organizational effectiveness, 
indicated by to what extent firms can meet the increasing demand from the product 
marketplace (i.e., revenue growth). Model 2 in Table 3 supports the prediction (z = 4.15 
and p < 0.001). Hypothesis 1b predicted that the likelihood of privatizations would 
increase with the organizational efficiency. Model 2 in Table 3 supports the prediction (z 
= 2.90 and p = 0.004). The model fit (log pseudolikelihood = -250.14 and Wald chi2 = 
66.54) improved significantly by adding organizational factors into the hazard function 
model, compared with model 1.    
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TABLE 3  
Results for the Survival Analysis of Privatization  
(SOE Organizational Factors) 
 
Variables Model 1: Controls   Model 2: Organizational Factors   
 
 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Robust 
S.E.  Z P> |Z| 
 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Robust 
S.E.  Z P> |Z| 
  2. Firm Age 1.005 .005 0.89 .372 
 
1.006 .005 1.14 .256 
  3. Total Liabilities .999 .001 -.68 .494 
 
.999 .001 -.58 .559 
  4. Return on Equity 1.939^ .697 1.84 .065 
 
1.88^ .701 1.70 .090 
  5. Equity Growth 1.004** .001 5.68 .001 
 
1.004** .001 5.14 .001 
  6. Provincial Government Deficit 1.000 .001 .860 .389 
 
1.000 .001 0.98 .325 
  7. Provincial GDP per Capita 0.999** .001 -2.05 .040 
 
0.999* .001 -2.35 .019 
  8. Organizational Efficiency 
     
1.001** .001 2.90 .004 
  9. Organizational Effectiveness 
     
1.067** .017 4.15 .001 
  10. Provincial Average FDI Size 
           11. Defense Mechanism  
           12. Provincial Sector 
Competitiveness 
           13. Provincial Government Revenue 
           
 
Number of subjects: 149 
 
Number of subjects: 145 
  
 
Number of privatizations: 79 
 
Number of privatizations: 76 
  
 
Number of obs: 547 
 
Number of obs: 527 
  
 
Time as risk: 547 
 
Time as risk: 527 
  
 
Log pseudolikelihood: -266.96 
 
Log pseudolikelihood: -250.27 
  
 
Wald chi2: 43.30 
 
Wald chi2: 66.54 
  
 
Prob> chi2= .001 
 
Prob> chi2= .001 
  Note: Efron method for ties; stratified by listed1; ^ p< .10, * p< .05, ** p< .01; two-tailed tests 
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From the governmental-owner perspective, hypothesis 2 predicted that the 
likelihood of privatizations (i.e., the hazard rates) would increase with the average size of 
the foreign direct investment projects, and model 3 in Table 4 supports the prediction (z =  
 
TABLE 4 
Results for the Survival Analysis of Privatization  
(Governmental-Owner Factors) 
 
Variables Model 1: Controls     
Model 3: Government-Owner 
Factors 
 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Robust 
S.E.  Z P> |Z| 
  
Hazard 
Ratio 
Robust 
S.E.  Z P> |Z| 
2. Firm Age 1.005 .005 0.89 .372 
  
1.006 .005 1.14 .255 
3. Total Liabilities .999 .001 -.68 .494 
  
1.000 .001 0.53 .594 
4. Return on Equity 1.939^ .697 1.84 .065 
  
2.16* .802 2.07 .038 
5. Equity Growth 1.004** .001 5.68 .001 
  
1.005** .001 4.83 .001 
6. Provincial Government Deficit 1.000 .001 .860 .389 
  
1.000 .001 1.14 .256 
7. Provincial GDP per Capita 0.999* .001 -2.05 .040 
  
0.999 .001 -1.23 .221 
8. Organizational Efficiency 
          9. Organizational Effectiveness 
          10. Provincial Average FDI Size 
      
1.001** .001 3.71 .001 
11. Defense Mechanism  
      
0.993* .003 -2.07 .039 
12. Provincial Sector 
Competitiveness 
      
0.978* .010 -2.02 .043 
13. Provincial Government Revenue 
      
1.001* .001 2.14 .032 
 
Number of subjects: 149 
  
Number of subjects: 149 
 
Number of privatizations: 79 
  
Number of privatizations: 75 
 
Number of obs: 547 
  
Number of obs: 538 
 
Time as risk: 547 
  
Time as risk: 538 
 
Log pseudolikelihood: -266.96 
  
Log pseudolikelihood: -246.25 
 
Wald chi2: 43.20 
  
Wald chi2: 44.42 
 
Prob> chi2= .001 
  
Prob> chi2= .001 
Note: Efron method for ties; stratified by listed1; ^ p< .10, * p< .05, ** p< .01; two-tailed tests 
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3.71 and p < 0.001). Hypothesis 3 predicted that the likelihood of privatizations (i.e., the 
hazard rates) would decrease with the provincial sector competitiveness in every province, 
and model 3 in Table 4 supports the prediction (z = -2.02; p = 0.043). Hypothesis 4 
predicted that the likelihood of privatizations would increase with the power asymmetry 
between the local government and the central government; model 3 in Table 4 supports 
the prediction (z = 2.14 and p = 0.032) as well. Hypothesis 5 predicted that the likelihood 
of privatizations would decrease with the degree of the defense mechanism firm adopted.  
Model 3 in Table 4 marginally supports the prediction (z = -2.07; p = 0.039). The model 
fit (log pseudolikelihood = -246.25 and Wald chi2 = 44.42) is acceptable.  
In the full model, all the relationships between the independent variables, either 
organizational factors or governmental factors, and the dependent variable (i.e., hazards) 
remain in a similar pattern. Specifically, in the full model (model 4) from Table 5, model 
4 in Table 5 supports hypothesis 1a (z = 4.25 and p < 0.001) and marginally supports 
hypothesis 1b (z = 1.76 and p = 0.079). Also, model 4 in Table 5 supports hypothesis 2 (z 
= 3.65 and p < 0.001), hypothesis 3 (z = -2.04 and p < 0.042), hypothesis 4 (z = 2.09; p = 
0.037), and hypothesis 5 (z = -2.03 and p = 0.042).  
The Cox regression-based test for equality of survival curves was also performed. 
By using the Stata application of stratification, there were 82 privatization events 
observed in the group of publicly listed firms; there were 54 privatization events 
observed in the group of non-listed firms. The log-ranked likelihood of Chi2 was 7.95, 
and the probability, which is larger than Chi2, was 0.0048. Clearly, the survival curves 
were significantly different for these two different groups of firms. Please refer to 
Appendix B for these tests. 
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TABLE 5 
Results for the Survival Analysis of Privatization (Full Model) 
 
Variables Model 1: Controls   
 
  Model 4: Full Model 
 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Robust 
S.E.  Z P> |Z| 
  
Hazard 
Ratio 
Robust 
S.E.  Z P> |Z| 
2. Firm Age 1.005 .005 0.89 .372 
  
1.007 .005 1.32 .190 
3. Total Liabilities .999 .001 -.68 .494 
  
1.000 .001 0.81 .420 
4. Return on Equity 1.939^ .697 1.84 .065 
  
2.099^ .817 1.90 .057 
5. Equity Growth  1.004** .001 5.68 .001 
  
1.004** .001 4.43 .001 
6. Provincial Government Deficit 1.000 .001 0.86 .389 
  
1.000 .001 1.16 .244 
7. Provincial GDP per Capita 0.999** .001 -2.05 .040 
  
0.999 .001 -1.31 .192 
8. Organizational Efficiency 
      
1.001^ .001 1.76 .079 
9. Organizational Effectiveness 
      
1.068** .017 4.25 .001 
10. Provincial Average FDI Size 
      
1.001** .001 3.65 .001 
11. Defense Mechanism  
      
.993* .003 -2.03 .042 
12. Provincial Sector 
Competitiveness 
      
0.977* .011 -2.04 .042 
13. Provincial Government Revenue 
      
1.001* .001 2.09 .037 
 
Number of subjects: 149 
  
Number of subjects: 145 
 
Number of privatizations: 79 
  
Number of privatizations:72 
 
Number of obs: 547 
  
Number of obs: 519 
 
Time as risk: 547 
  
Time as risk: 519 
 
Log pseudolikelihood: -266.96 
  
Log pseudolikelihood: -229.773 
 
Wald chi2: 43.20 
  
Wald chi2: 71.87 
 
Prob> chi2= .001 
  
Prob> chi2= .001 
Note 1: Efron method for ties; stratified by listed1; ^ p< .10, * p< .05, ** p< .01; two-tailed tests 
Note 2: Roust variance-covariance matrix used; Cox regression-based test for equality of survival curves are significant 
(i.e., pr> chi2= .0048) 
Note 3: Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions are significant and therefore satisfied the assumptions of Cox 
modeling (i.e., pr> chi2= .0015) 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Over the last 20 years, scholars across different fields in social sciences (e.g., 
economics, finance, and strategic management) have acknowledged that privatization 
plays an important role in the regional economic development, market-based resource 
allocation mechanism, organizational transformation of state-owned enterprises, and 
better allocation of managers to production assets. The purpose of this dissertation has 
been to investigate the effect of governmental-owner power imbalance on privatization. 
Results of this study provide information to help us better understand the effects of 
governmental-owner power imbalance on strategic actions of SOEs. Specifically, the 
results from this study suggest that organizational effectiveness and efficiency of an SOE 
increase the likelihood of its privatization. Results also show that provincial 
governmental owners are more likely to privatize SOEs if they can successfully attract 
foreign direct investment projects. Furthermore, the likelihood of privatization increases 
with the power asymmetry between the provincial government and the central 
government but decreases with the degree of the defense mechanisms used by SOEs. 
Table 6 provides a summary of the study results. 
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TABLE 6 
Summary of the Results 
 
Hypotheses  Variable Name Operationlized/Proxies  Results 
 
H1a 
SOE Organizational 
Effectiveness 
 Revenue growth= {[sales t- sales t-1]/ 
sales t-1} Supported (+) 
H1b 
SOE Organizational 
Efficiency  Revenue/number of employees 
Marginally 
Supported (+) 
H2 Size of FDI Projects Amount of  FDI / Number of FDI projects  Supported (+) 
H3 
Provincial sector 
competitiveness 
 Return on sales for the pharmaceutical 
sector in each province Supported (-) 
H4 Power asymmetry Provincial government revenue Supported (+) 
H5 Defense Mechanism 
Total number of patents, new 
products/procedures Supported (-) 
 
The first section of this chapter discusses the findings of the study, the second 
section examines the conclusions and implications, and the third section discusses the 
limitations and areas of future research. 
DISCUSSION  
Organizational Effectiveness  
This research hypothesized a positive relationship between organizational 
effectiveness and the likelihood of privatization (H1a). Because the effectiveness of any 
organization is ultimately judged by those social actors (e.g., customers) outside of the 
organization (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), organizational effectiveness indicates to what 
extent organizations do well in meeting demands from the product marketplace. One 
major characteristic of state-owned enterprises is that these firms can request and secure 
resources from their governmental owners directly, and they can acquire resources from 
customers. Hence, hypothesis 1a posited that the effectiveness of SOEs in acquiring 
resources in the product marketplace motivates them to escape from their governmental 
owners. This hypothesis is supported by this study.  
88 
 
 
 
Organizational Efficiency 
Interestingly, in the past two decades the outcome-orientated studies have 
dominated the literature of privatization, as evidence shows that scholars generally are 
interested in testing the efficiency gain and the improved corporate governance as 
outcomes of privatization (Boubakri et al., 2005a, 2005b; Boutchkov & Megginson, 2000; 
D’Souza & Megginson, 1999; Havrylyshyn & McGettigan, 1999). By using panel data 
across different countries, some leading scholars have demonstrated that the improved 
efficiency of privatized SOEs is a valid finding on the topic of privatization (e.g., 
Megginson & Netter, 2001; Megginson et al., 2004; D’Souza et al., 2005).  
While researchers appreciate the above contributions, what type of firm (i.e., 
efficient SOE versus inefficient SOE) is being privatized is a critical question worth 
investigation. Because of the effects of sample selection (Baum, 2006; Woodridge, 2002, 
2008), if only more efficient SOEs have a higher likelihood of being privatized, the less-
efficient SOEs never were privatized and therefore never entered into the sample of 
privatization scholars. Hence, the efficiency, as a determinant of privatization, could offer 
insights about the post-performance in the setting of privatization. Along this logic, 
hypothesis 1b posited that there is a positive association between the organizational 
efficiency and the likelihood of privatization. Hypothesis 1b is marginally supported.  
Governmental Owners 
As research in the field of development economics indicates, governmental 
owners’ incentives to engage privatization projects are determined by the trade-offs 
between political benefits and economic costs (Qian & Roland, 1998). The economic 
costs of selling SOEs are balanced by the economic benefits negated by foreign direct 
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investment projects, as hypothesis 2 posited. Each and every one of the provincial 
governors is evaluated by the provincial economic growth rate (i.e., GDP growth in every 
province) on an annual basis; hence, these governmental owners consider themselves 
macro-managers for regional economic development.   
As development economists suggest, the decentralization of fiscal authority to 
provincial governments, together with hardening budget control of government revenues 
and state-owned enterprises, shapes the economic commitment of local governments 
(Qian & Roland, 1998). In fact, decentralization of fiscal policy and hardening budget 
control motivate local governmental owners to initiate asset allocation decisions, which 
proceed in economically sensible ways. Previously, all these SOEs, especially the 
troublesome ones, could request fiscal resources from the local governments, and then the 
local governments could request fiscal resources from the central governments, i.e., 
centralization of the fiscal authority. The implementation of a decentralized fiscal policy 
means the central government no longer injects fiscal resources into these SOEs. If the 
local government wants to bail out some inefficient SOEs, these local governmental 
owners have to use their own fiscal resources. As the market-based mechanism is 
developing in each and every one of the provinces, foreign direct investment projects 
flow in. Compared with SOEs, foreign direct investment projects usually bring modern 
technology, higher productivity, and higher efficiency. Therefore, FDI projects contribute 
to local GDP growth. These local governments that did a great job attracting FDI projects 
are less motivated to keep SOEs under their exclusive control. After all, these local 
governmental owners’ annual evaluations and their future career advancements come 
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from the GDP growth rate in their region, regardless of whether the GDP is contributed to 
by SOEs or FDIs. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is supported.  
Regional Sector Competitiveness  
Unlike modern professional fund investors, who research annual reports of each 
firm in their portfolio and conduct due diligence carefully before making any significant 
asset-allocation decisions, governmental owners are normally less interested in knowing 
how to create a competitive advantage for every single firm (Boycko et al., 1996). From 
the resource dependence theory viewpoint, it is very logical in the following way: 
Professional fund managers are evaluated by the market-based stock performance every 
quarter, and their compensation is tied with this evaluation system. Governmental owners, 
however, manage these SOEs for their political capital, i.e., national champions. It is 
clear that governmental owners have no cash flow rights of any SOE (Fama, 1980; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and their compensation is not tied with the performance of 
each individual firm. However, the national ranking of each sector is the key evaluation 
factor for these governmental owners. If a sector has the potential to be ranked higher in 
all the 30 provinces in China, the governmental owner has a higher chance of being 
promoted. Hence, this governmental owner has a less likelihood of privatizing SOEs in 
this sector.  
In short, these governmental owners have political goals (i.e., to grow national 
champion sectors in their province) as well as SOE asset management responsibilities. 
This conflict of interests motivates the governmental owners to make asset allocation 
decisions by considering an aggregated measure of sector-specific competitiveness in 
their province. Therefore, competitiveness of assets in one sector (e.g., the 
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pharmaceutical sector) may influence the decision of relinquishing control (e.g., 
privatization) made by provincial governmental owners. Thus, hypothesis 3 is supported. 
Power Asymmetry 
As a significant economic reform phenomenon, privatization is a carefully 
designed national policy. Aligning the interests of local governments with a country’s 
economic reform and development is frequently the focus and challenge of national 
policies, including those of China (Qian & Roland, 1998). Previously, all the firms in 
China were state owned. Furthermore, there were 30 different provincial governmental 
owners for these SOEs. The implementation of the privatization process depends on the 
decisions of these provincial governments, while the design of the privatization policy is 
formulated by the central government. Conceptually, there is a power map composed by 
these three types of actors: the central government, local governmental owners, and SOEs.   
On the top of the power map/hierarchy, as the market-based institution is 
developing in transition economies, including China, the central government decides to 
privatize SOEs nationwide because it faces a unique financial incentive: it will be too 
expensive to maintain inefficient enterprises once the central governmental owner gives 
up its monopoly power in many sectors (Jin et al., 2005). In other words, as foreign firms 
flow in, if inefficient SOEs cannot compete with foreign direct investment firms in the 
product marketplace, SOEs will request fiscal resources from the central government as 
their last channel of securing resources and increasing survival rate. From a 
governmental-owner perspective, this is expensive.  
The same logic applies to local governments. Once provincial governmental 
owners have the authority to decide the timing and sequence of privatization and to adapt 
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privatization to local economic development purposes, the hard budget constraints made 
provincial governmental owners cannot afford to make mistakes by keeping inefficient 
SOEs for an extended period of time (e.g., Kornai, 1988).     
Previously, studies have found a positive relationship between decentralized fiscal 
incentives given to provincial governments and the development of local market-based 
resource allocation mechanisms (Jin et al., 2005). Provincial governments with less 
revenue have less discretion in deciding and implementing policies on their own. The 
higher power at the level of central government, however, leads to faster realization of 
policies of that level, including privatization. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is supported.  
Defense Mechanism 
A central focus of this study is that SOEs face a tension between the need for 
resources from their governmental owners and the potentially damaging misappropriation 
of their own resources (Katila et al., 2008), given the political interests of these 
governmental owners (e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; Perotti, 1995). The multiple 
objectives rather than a focus on profit maximization and political intervention distort the 
strategic objectives of SOEs. For instance, provincial governmental owners require SOEs 
to produce large volumes of low margin drugs in order to increase the production target, 
even though the firm wants to research and innovate for smaller volumes of higher 
margin but more profitable products. Hence, the decision of the governmental owner can 
hurt the firm’s competitive advantage. Defense mechanisms can mitigate this 
misappropriation and help the SOE maintain its power in the relationship with its 
governmental owner. So when defense mechanisms are available, firms are more likely to 
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leverage power from a rather remote but helpful actor in order to protect their resources. 
Patent defense, therefore, is an effective defense mechanism (e.g., Katila & Mang, 2003).  
Hence, it is logical to argue that SOEs will create defense mechanisms such as 
patent defense to mitigate the constraints imposed by the provincial government. In the 
pharmaceutical sector, for example, the central government in China evaluates the 
production permission (i.e., the official approval product line extension) in that country. 
Also, the central government decides whether to grant patent and new-generic-drug (not 
completely new chemical component but newly developed delivery systems) certification 
in China. With national patent and new-generic-drug certification, firms receive 
tremendous benefits from the central government, which include direct participation in 
pharmaceutical sector policy formulation processes, higher product prices, and more 
funding supports for R&D projects and clinical trials.  
The defense mechanisms created by SOEs, however, cannot effectively mitigate 
the constraints of the local governments. This is because local governments have 
relatively more power in the hierarchy, as hypothesis 5 posited. As long as local 
governmental owners are on the way to implementing privatization as their individual 
regional policy, they have the authority to decide the timing and sequence of the process 
because they are responsible for their provincial fiscal resources and government revenue. 
Any bailout projects for inefficient SOEs are no longer covered by the central 
government. Therefore, provincial governmental owners directly oversee their firms, and 
stronger defense mechanisms adopted by SOEs will motivate provincial governmental 
owners to hold these firms for longer periods of time, as the bilateral power imbalance 
map indicates. Hypothesis 5 posited such a bilateral power imbalance and is supported.    
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
First, this study has theoretical implications for resource dependence theory.  
Resource dependence theory was originally developed to provide an alternative logic to 
economic theories (mainly price theories) of mergers and board interlocks, and to 
understand precisely the type of organizational interdependencies that have played such a 
role in market failures (Pfeffer, 2003). Basically, resource dependence theory is an 
externally oriented metaphor that suggests that firms sometimes take power asymmetry-
based actions/strategies in achieving competitive advantages in such a system.  
I aimed to explore the unrealized potential of resource dependence as a strong 
explanation of SOE and governmental-owner power imbalances. Integrating with the 
theory of power exchange (Emerson, 1962), I sought to recognize power as an inherently 
bilateral phenomenon in a system that contributes to the theory of resource dependence 
by providing both the theoretical framework and the empirical test of a bilateral power 
explanation for differences in SOEs’ propensities to engage in privatization. The original 
discussion of the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and many 
empirical studies in the field of management emphasize the firm-centric unilateral 
approach, which does not distinguish the bilateral power imbalances that emerged from 
Emerson’s (1962) exchange theory. The bilateral approach of this study, by theorizing the 
reciprocal power imbalances and resource dependence between firms and their 
government owners, aimed to extend the resource dependence theory.  
Specifically, this study offers two distinct theoretical contributions to resource 
dependence accounts for ownership-firm action:  
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1) Governmental owners constrain strategic actions of SOEs because SOEs rely 
on acquiring resources from their governmental owners. In turn, governmental 
owners also rely on SOEs to fulfill their economic and political objectives 
such as provincial GDP growth. Hence, we should extend the firm-centric 
logic from the original discussion of resources dependence theory and 
simultaneously analyze the power dependence from the owner perspective. In 
a system composed by firms (e.g., SOEs) and their external actors (e.g., 
governmental owners), the power exchange and dependence should be 
investigated from a bilateral perspective. The empirical finding that 
governmental owners who can successfully attract FDI projects in their 
provinces have a higher likelihood to sell/private SOEs confirms this 
theoretical implication. If researchers only take a firm-centric perspective, 
such a phenomenon cannot be explained theoretically.  
2) Organizations live in a system that is composed of different powerful actors. 
This is the key passage of resource dependence theory. However, these 
external actors, with sufficient power, may have different interests, and these 
different interests motivate them to share organizational strategies in different 
ways. In the power map composed by SOEs, their provincial governmental 
owners, and the central government, the power asymmetry among provincial 
governments and the central government determines the privatization of SOEs. 
Hence, linking the power dependence between different external actors of 
organizations contributes to resource dependence theory.  
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Second, this study generates theoretical implications for the field of strategic 
management. In understanding the impacts on organizations from the public policy 
perspective, strategic management works have mainly been silent, particularly in 
government policies dealing with economic actors and different types of markets (e.g., 
financial markets and product marketplace). In fact, discussions of markets, competition, 
and regulations are considered research domains of economists when price is considered 
the key mechanism for resource allocation.  
Compared with price, however, power is considered a superior mechanism to 
regulate access to critical resources in any non-perfect market (e.g., Coase, 1937; Rajan 
& Zinglas, 1998). According to resource dependence researchers, power explains the 
importance of the internal-organization and third-party relationship-based investments. 
For example, as a result of the increasing power and uncertainty generated by the stock 
markets in the U.S., the background for candidates for CEO succession changed from 
engineering to finance in multiple industries (Pfeffer, 1992). Hence, ideas of resource 
dependence and power imbalance, over ideas of efficient markets and price mechanisms, 
may provide accurate explanation for many strategic actions (e.g., privatization) as 
economic phenomena as well as organizational phenomena. In a way, the emphasis of 
power as opposed to norms/isomorphism distinguishes resource dependence from neo-
institutional economics (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995). Therefore, insights from 
the strategic management perspective (e.g., the defense mechanism of small firms) add to 
our understanding of the contemporary knowledge of corporate governance, regulatory 
failure, and strategic decision-making (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Katila et al., 2008).  
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Third, this study has theoretical implications for the topic of privatization. From 
the determinants of privatization, the bilateral logic and the empirical modeling approach 
of including both privatized firms and firms that remain stated-owned in one sample 
provide an alternative way to understand the topic of privatization.  
1) As an established topic in the fields of finance and economics, the empirical 
efforts have been focused on the outcomes, especially efficiency outcomes of 
privatization. However, what type of firm (i.e., efficient SOE versus 
inefficient SOE) is being privatized is a critical question worthy of 
investigation. If more efficient SOEs have a higher likelihood of being 
privatized, it is natural that their efficiency outcomes increase afterwards 
because the less-efficient SOEs never were privatized.  
2) Governmental owners have complicated interests and selling techniques of 
selling SOEs. It is important to acknowledge these important external factors 
to avoid over-simplified conclusions of privatization outcomes.    
Fourth, this study adds to our understanding about organizational strategic actions 
in transition economies. The government-firm relationship is one of the most important 
microeconomic relationships in transition economies (e.g., Nee, 1992; Roland, 2000). 
Understanding this relationship helps us to improve our understanding of the difference 
between private firms and government-owned firms. As this study suggests, there is a 
difference in objectives between government and private owners. For example, a private 
investor, like a bank in the U.S., will only bail out a firm if the monetary benefit exceeds 
the cost, whereas the governmental owner will take into account other benefits such as 
social welfare or personal political capital. Governmental owners pursue different goals 
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than economic efficiency, and they even directly intervene in SOEs in order to achieve 
these political or social objectives. The main justification for why private firms are more 
efficient is when control rights are in private hands, it is more costly for a government to 
intervene in a private firm to force it to deviate from efficient strategic decision-making 
(e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). In addition, different provincial governments (i.e., 
different governmental branches) may have different commitments to a market-based 
economy, and therefore the likelihood to make the privatization decision varies across 
different provincial governmental owners.   
 This study offers a distinct view of China, a classical example of a transition 
economy. The fiscal decentralization arrangements in China are particularly interesting 
because fiscal contracts between provincial and central governments are close to optimal 
incentive contracts, whereby provincial governments are fully residual claimants of 
marginal governmental revenues (Qian & Roland, 1998; Roland, 2000). This fiscal 
decentralization policy creates a partial alignment of motivations of provincial 
government with the development of foreign direct investment projects. Most of the 
SOEs are owned and being privatized by provincial governments. It is important to study 
SOE strategic actions in this context of transition economies because, so far, privatization 
studies have been dominated by samples from the United Kingdom, Russia, and Western 
Europe. Privatization in the United Kingdom and Russia, however, is designed and 
implemented by central governments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Frye & Shleifer, 1997). 
Basically, Russian provincial governments have very little power over the privatization 
policy and have no control of their governmental revenue even though the focal sold SOE 
is located in their region (Qian et al., 2006). Hence, this research adds a very important 
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dimension on central–local government power imbalances and their impacts to SOE 
strategic actions in the literature: China’s experience about SOE actions/strategies is 
triggered by the fiscal decision-making of power that has shifted from the central 
government to provincial governments. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Limitations 
Despite the potential theoretical contributions of this study, the empirical analysis 
adopted here is subject to many limitations. Here I discuss three major limitations:  
1) In order to gain the in-depth understanding about the firm and government-
owner power dynamics, I focused on one industry (i.e., the pharmaceutical 
sector) in one country (i.e., China). The patent-based defense mechanism may 
have stronger applications in knowledge intensive industries such as the 
pharmaceutical and information technology sectors. Because of such a 
research design, I was able to include both publicly listed firms and non-listed 
firms into one dataset and distinguish the Cox regression-based survival 
curves accurately. Comprehensive firm-level data from multiple industries in 
different nations would add more industry effects into the model.  
2) Based on the eight-year time-span database, I performed several robustness 
tests and Cox assumption tests to distinguish between the bilateral ideas. 
Twenty-year or even longer time-span data would be more convincing.  
3) The analyses focused solely on the formal power dependence among the 
central government, provincial governments, and SOEs and ignored the social 
psychological factors and other informal factors that may affect relations 
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between a firm and its government owners. For example, I did not examine 
issues such as demographics, age, social networks, or educational 
backgrounds between government decision-makers and organizational 
decision-makers.  
Future Research 
This study focused on the antecedents of privatization. Even though the literature 
of privatization is dominated by efficiency outcomes, empirical research done on the 
entrepreneurial outcomes of privatization is surprisingly rare. Given the theoretical 
importance of organizational transformation dimension, the major shift of corporate 
governance (e.g., from governmental owners to private owners) affects innovation and 
other related entrepreneurial outcomes. Hence, I believe this is a promising future 
direction for research. Privatization is a key indicator of the organizational transformation 
in which the entrepreneurial-oriented mindset has replaced the previous political-oriented 
mindset. The private owners, compared with former state owners, have more effective 
influence over the human capital of the workforce of the firm and also have a higher 
capability to identify and exploit potential business opportunities and create values for 
customers. Hence, a privatized firm should improve its product lines and market 
penetration strategies by upgrading product development strategies and introducing new 
products to meet consumer needs more closely. As the entrepreneurial-oriented mindset 
replaces the political-based mindset to build the core competitive advantage of the firm, 
the product strategy refocusing (measured as new products, upgraded product lines, and 
market penetration rates) indicates a variety of entrepreneurial outcomes of privatization. 
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Therefore, one future research direction will be in the alternative way of investigating the 
entrepreneurial outcomes of privatization. 
Resource dependence theory is highly complementary to transaction cost 
economics, particularly with respect to the bilateral dependence associated with asset 
specificity (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). A future integrated model based on power 
imbalance and transaction cost would allow researchers to explore the role of ex-ante 
power imbalance on the ways in which organizations seek to enhance their ex-post 
relationship-based specific assets. Even though the powerful actor would benefit from 
dependencies in order to reap the benefits of asset-specific investments, such integration 
would also prevent the external actor that is a more powerful ex-ante form exploiting 
these less powerful ones. From the product marketplace, the innovation attributes of 
certain products are constrained by some powerful existing customers (e.g., BlackBerry 
& Touch Screen LED). In the field of management, therefore, future research should 
examine this power dependence link from the perspective of strategic decision-making 
(e.g., Christensen & Bower, 1996; Yli-Renko & Janakiraman, 2008).   
Institutional systems shape strategic actions of firms and their governmental 
owners. The theoretical emphasis of institutional theory is more on the creation of the 
institutional underpinnings of markets to encourage a vigorous process of organizational 
actions (e.g., product mix or market entry). Privatization alone may not deliver the 
desired economic outcomes in the absence of such institutional underpinnings. In fact, 
privatization leads to unpleasant surprises in a few countries (Roland, 2000). These 
institutional underpinnings include not only the legal and financial systems but also the 
self-enforcing social norms and respect for commitment that can foster entrepreneurship 
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and trust. Different countries have different institutional systems because adequate 
institutions must evolve over time. Hence, a cross-country study might be a desirable 
approach to integrate institutional theory with resource dependence theory.  
CONCLUSION 
Privatization generates significant influence on firms and governments across 
different countries, especially in transition economies. By including two categories of 
government owners (central and provincial) into my conceptual model, I attempted to 
advance existing knowledge about the power dependence and constraints of SOEs in 
general and the decision to privatize in particular. Drawing clear boundary conditions for 
the power imbalance model in such a theoretical power hierarchy (Figure 1), I tried to 
resolve the seemingly contradictory puzzle of why different government owners generate 
different impacts in privatization of SOEs. This study also makes the conceptual power 
hierarchy model applicable for a spectrum of organizational responses to external forces, 
while firms formulate dependencies with different powerful actors to reduce uncertainty 
and secure critical resources from their business environments.  
In summary, the bilateral approach of this study, by theorizing the reciprocal 
power imbalances between firms and their government owners, showed that three types 
of social actors (i.e., the central government, local governments, and SOEs) play 
significant roles in the theoretical explanation of privatization. Results suggest that 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency of an SOE increase the likelihood of its 
privatization. In addition, results show that provincial governmental owners are more 
likely to privatize SOEs if they can successfully attract foreign direct investment projects. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of privatization increases with the power asymmetry between 
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the provincial government and the central government but decreases with the degree of 
the defense mechanisms used by SOEs. 
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APPENDIX A 
 POWER MEASURES 
 
TABLE A1 
The Summary of Power-Related Empirical Measures 
 
Authors Journal Article Name Construct Name Construct Measures 
Anderson & 
Reeb, 2004; 
page 224 
A.S.Q. 
Board Composition: 
Balancing Family 
Influence in S&P 500 
Balance of Power 
The measure breaks the ratio of the number of 
family directors to the number of independent 
directors into three categories: (1) from 0.0 to 0.50; 
(2) from 0.501 to 1.00, and (3) above 1.01. 
Gargiulo, 
1993; page 11 A.S.Q. 
Two-Step Leverage: 
Managing Constraint in 
Organizational Politics 
Co-optive leverage 
between a subordinate 
and the authority 
above his or her 
immediate supervisor 
The subjective one: self-reported confidential 
discussions ties (# of relationships) on topics 
affecting their performance as decision-makers. The 
objective one: identified joint membership in one of 
the political/social groups in the 1990 elections to 
the board of the firm. Combining the two measures, 
the author created four categories of co-optive 
leverage efforts. 
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Westphal & 
Bendar, 2008; 
page 45 
A.S.Q. The Pacification of Institutional Investors 
Ingratiatory behavior 
and persuasion, used 
as a soft power to 
balance the force of 
institutional investors 
to prevent changes in 
corporate governance 
and strategy 
There are six survey items for ingratiatory and seven 
items for persuasion. For ingratiatory, items include 
―how often do you compliment the insights on 
institutional investors,‖ ―how many times do you 
express agreement,‖ etc. For persuasion, items 
include ―how much time did you spend attempting 
to persuade the institutional investor,‖ ―on how 
many occasions have you tried to convince this 
institutional investor,‖ etc. 
Dencker, 
2009; page 
465 
A.S.Q. 
Relative Bargaining 
Power, Corporate 
Restructuring, and 
Managerial Incentives 
Relative bargaining 
power between the 
firm and its managers 
The tradeoff between bonuses and promotions; the 
tradeoff between bonuses and increases of base 
salary 
Siegel, 2007; 
page 640 A.S.Q. 
Contingent Political 
Capital and 
International Alliances: 
Evidence from South 
Korea 
Contingent capital 
through elite 
sociopolitical 
networks to the regime 
in power 
Regional background, high school, work history 
(including government work history), and business 
association 
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Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 
2005; page 
185 
A.S.Q. 
Power Imbalance, 
Mutual Dependence, 
and Constraint 
Absorption: A Closer 
Look at Resource 
Dependence Theory 
Power imbalance at 
the industry level 
C i-> j is defined as the total dollar value of goods 
and services sold by industry ―i‖ to industry ―j.‖ 
Hence, authors constructed a dyadic measure of 
power imbalance (PI) between business units in 
industry ―i‖ to business units in industry ―j‖: PI i<->j 
= | C j->i - Ci->j|. Because this measure is not 
distributed normally, they used Stata’s Inskew0 
function to compute the natural logarithm of the 
original variable, choosing the exponent so that the 
skewness of the transformed variable has zero value. 
Katila, 
Rosenberger, 
& Eisenhardt, 
2008; page 
310 
A.S.Q. 
Swimming with Sharks: 
Technology Ventures, 
Defense Mechanisms 
and Corporate 
Relationships 
Defense mechanism 
variables to prevent 
resource 
misappropriation 
1) Patent defense, and 2) Trade secrecy—both of 
them are measured by using the Carnegie Mellon 
Survey of industrial R&D. Respondents estimated 
the effectiveness of defense mechanisms to protect 
technical inventions. 3) Timing defense is measured 
by the investment round (e.g., first, second, etc.) and 
authors logged this variable to reduce skewness 
because these authors believe investment round 
reflects the venture’s maturity to allow financial 
resources to flow in. 
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Rangan & 
Sengul, 2009; 
page 244 
A.S.Q. 
The Influence of 
Macro Structure on 
the Foreign Market 
Performance of 
Transnational 
Firms: The Value of 
IGO Connections, 
Export Dependence, 
and Immigration 
Links 
Export 
dependence 
The variable of export dependence is measured 
as the home share in total exports from the 
host, divided by the home share in total exports 
from the world. 
Hoffman, 
1987; page 6 J.I.B.S. 
Political Versus Rational 
Sources of Decision Power 
Among Country Clusters 
Decision power: As 
the results of 
decision-makers 
efforts to cope with 
uncertainty 
This variable was measured by a multi-item and 
multi-rater scale that can reflect choices of 
product/markets, technology, and 
administrative structures to adapt the 
organization to changes in its environment. 
Fischer & 
Polock, 2004; 
page 463 
A.M.J. 
Effects Of Social Capital and 
Power on Surviving 
Transformational Change: 
The Case of Initial Public 
Offerings 
Power as a valuable 
transformational 
shield 
1) CEO ownership: this measure equals the 
percentage of shares outstanding that was 
beneficial to the CEO. 2) Venture capital 
ownership: this measure is a Herfindahl index 
by squaring and summing the percentage of 
multiple VC entities. 
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Chatterjee, 
1991; page 
441 
A.M.J. 
Gains in Vertical 
Acquisitions and Market 
Power: Theory and Evidence 
Market power 
The market power is a four-item seller 
concentration ratios- which measures the 
proportion of industry sales accounted for by 
the four largest sellers- were used as proxies for 
market power. 
Shen & 
Cannella, 
2002; page 
1198 
A.M.J. 
Power Dynamics within Top 
Management and Their 
Impacts on CEO Dismissal 
Followed by Inside 
Succession 
Power dynamics of 
top management team 
CEO origin (insider or outsider); proportion of 
non-CEO insider directors; non-CEO executive 
ownership. 
Cool & 
Henderson, 
1998; page 
914 
S.M.J. 
Power and Firm Profitability 
in Supply Chains: French 
Manufacturing Industry in 
1993 
Power of suppliers; 
buyer power 
Eight questions for supplier power (e.g., 
impacts on seller’s cost); nine questions for 
buyer power (e.g., buyer concentration). 
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Kim, 
Hoskisson, & 
Wan, 2004; 
page 618 
S.M.J. 
Power Dependence, 
Diversification Strategy, and 
Performance in Keiretsu 
Member Firms 
Power dependence 
Power dependence is measured by whether the 
firm CEO is on the Keiretsu Group’s 
President’s Council, which serves as a forum 
for group-wide information sharing and 
decision-making. Thus, president council 
members are in a more powerful position than 
other firms. 
Shervani, 
Frazier, & 
Challagalla, 
2007; page 
642 
S.M.J. 
The Moderating Influence of 
Firm Market Power on the 
Transaction Cost Economics 
Model: An Empirical Test in 
a Forward Channel 
Integration Context 
Firm market power 
1) Overal market power: two items; 2) Product 
differentiation: two items; 3) Market share: two 
items. 
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Michael, 
2000; page 
499 
S.M.J. 
Investments to Create 
Bargaining Power: The Case 
of Franchising 
Bargaining power 
The variable is measured as tapered integration, 
which means ―some portion (but not all) of the 
firm’s requirements for an input is supplied in-
house or some portion of outputs is sold 
(consumed) in-house‖ in the franchising 
literature. 
Golden & 
Zajac, 2001; 
page 1098 
S.M.J. 
When Will Boards Influence 
Strategy? 
Inclination><Power=Strategic 
Change 
Board power 
The variable is measured as the relative power 
of the board over its CEO. There are multiple 
behavioral and structural items offered by the 
authors through a survey instrument. 
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APPENDIX B 
 POST-HOC TESTS 
Test 1: Cox regression test for equality of survival curves 
 
 
Test 2: Log-rank test for equality of survival functions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Pr>chi2 =     0.0048
           LR chi2(1) =       7.95
Total           136         136.00       1.0000
                                               
2                54          70.14       0.7863
1                82          65.86       1.2919
                                               
listed1    observed       expected       hazard
            Events         Events       Relative
              Pr>chi2 =     0.0015
              chi2(1) =      10.11
Total           136         136.00
                                  
2                54          70.14
1                82          65.86
                                  
listed1    observed       expected
            Events         Events
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